Security and Energy Harvesting for MIMO-OFDM Networks by Hoang, Tiep M et al.
IEE
E P
ro
of
AUTHOR QUERIES
AUTHOR PLEASE ANSWER ALL QUERIES
PLEASE NOTE: We cannot accept new source files as corrections for your article. If possible, please annotate the
PDF proof we have sent you with your corrections and upload it via the Author Gateway. Alternatively, you may send
us your corrections in list format. You may also upload revised graphics via the Author Gateway.
AQ:1 = Please confirm or add details for any funding or financial support for the
research of this article.
AQ:2 = Please provide the department name for Queen’s University Belfast where
the authors Tiep M. Hoang and Trung Q. Duong are currently
affiliated with.
AQ:3 = Please confirm the postal code for University of Technology Sydney.
AQ:4 = Please provide the department name for University of Liverpool where the
author Alan Marshall is currently affiliated with.
AQ:5 = Note that if you require corrections/changes to tables or figures, you must
supply the revised files, as these items are not edited for you.
AQ:6 = Please provide the publisher location for Ref. [28].
IEE
E P
ro
of
IEEE TRANSACTIONS ON COMMUNICATIONS 1
Security and Energy Harvesting for
MIMO-OFDM Networks
Tiep M. Hoang , Ahmed El Shafie , Senior Member, IEEE,
Daniel Benevides da Costa , Senior Member, IEEE,
Trung Q. Duong , Senior Member, IEEE, Hoang Duong Tuan ,
and Alan Marshall , Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract— We consider a multiple-input multiple-output1
(MIMO) orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM)2
network in which a source node, Alice, communicates with an3
energy-harvesting destination node, Bob, in the presence of a4
passive eavesdropper. To secure the wireless transmission, Alice5
generates a hybrid artificial noise (AN) in both frequency and6
time domains. Moreover, in order to collect more energy, Bob7
splits the received signal power of the cyclic prefix of each OFDM8
block. We then propose two non-convex optimization problems9
to balance both the need for security and the need for harvesting10
energy at Bob. While one considers maximizing the secrecy rate,11
the other approach aims at maximizing the harvested energy.12
Path-following algorithms of low computational complexity are13
developed and evaluated. Our numerical results show the gain14
of our proposed scheme and the effectiveness of our proposed15
algorithms.16
Index Terms— MIMO, OFDM, SWIPT, security, energy17
harvesting, hybrid artificial noise, path-following algorithms.18
I. INTRODUCTION19
OVER the past decade, wireless security has been widely20 investigated since wireless networks are vulnerable to21
passive eavesdropping [2]–[5]. Harvesting energy in secure22
wireless networks has also drawn the research community’s23
attention recently [6]–[8]. Obviously, considering wireless24
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security and energy-harvesting is generally more challenging 25
than considering each problem separately [7], [9], [10]. 26
Many works have examined the impact of secrecy 27
parameters on the harvested energy and clarified the role of 28
energy-harvesting parameters on the physical-layer security 29
performance. For example, [11] considered a relaying network 30
and then designed beamforming vector and time-switching 31
(TS) coefficient to maximize secrecy rate subject to energy- 32
related constraints. Moreover, [12] focused on minimizing 33
the transmit power subject to rate-related constraints and 34
considered power-splitting (PS) protocol instead of TS pro- 35
tocol. Using the TS protocol for energy-harvesting and using 36
game theory to cope with jamming attacks, the authors of [13] 37
evaluated the secure performance of a wireless secret key 38
generation system. The results in [14] indicated that the secure 39
performance of a relaying network would be improved by 40
using a TS-based relaying protocol (instead of merely process- 41
ing information). Both the TS and PS protocols were discussed 42
in [15] with the emphasis on protecting a relaying network. 43
Furthermore, security and energy-harvesting for orthogonal 44
frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) systems were also 45
simultaneously studied in previous works [16]–[18]. However, 46
the proposed systems in [16] and [18] were single-input single- 47
output (SISO) systems, while [17] had to invoke a jammer to 48
cope with information leakage. Moreover, the methodologies 49
used in these works might not be extended to more general 50
cases such as multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO). Hav- 51
ing said that, the idea of using OFDM to simultaneously 52
improve security level and received energy in these works 53
is worth our consideration. For instance, [18] took advantage 54
of cyclic prefix, which is one of the most characteristics of 55
the OFDM technique, to improve the energy harvested at the 56
intended energy-harvesting user. Apart from the linear energy- 57
harvesting (EH) model, several non-linear EH models are 58
studied in [19]–[21]. In [19], the authors maximize the sum 59
throughput and the minimum individual throughput based on 60
the constraints of time and power allocation. From a hardware 61
design perspective, the authors in [20] and [21] consider 62
power conversion/transmission efficiency in connection with 63
EH circuits. Especially, the EH model in [21] includes the 64
sensitivity and saturation threshold of EH circuits. Such non- 65
linear EH models are relatively practical, but applying them to 66
secure wireless systems is really challenging. To simplify the 67
0090-6778 © 2019 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
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analysis, we choose to use a linear EH model as in most of68
the existing works. Hence, the topic of non-linear EH models69
is out of the scope of our paper.70
Among the aforementioned works, our paper is closely71
related to [18]. In [18], the authors considered a SISO-72
OFDM simultaneous wireless information and power trans-73
fer (SWIPT) in the presence of a passive eavesdropper. As an74
extension of [18] to the MIMO case, this work considers75
a MIMO-OFDM SWPIT system. Noticeably, [18] suggests76
a non-convex problem for the trade-off between information77
security and energy-harvesting, but cannot solve it through78
any analytical methodology. In other words, the approach79
in [18] is unable to apply to similar works. In contrast, this80
paper provides a computational framework for resolving non-81
convex problems relating to the trade-off between security and82
energy-harvesting. Following that, we face the challenges in83
transforming non-convex problems into convex approxima-84
tion ones1. More specifically, to address these non-convex85
optimization problems, we develop path-following iterative86
algorithms, which iteratively improve feasible points for the87
original non-convex problems. Thereby, we obtain at least88
a sub-optimal solution to each of the proposed problems.89
It should also be noted that this paper simultaneously discusses90
the frequency-domain artificial noise (freq. AN) design and91
the time-domain artificial noise (temporal AN) design. This92
type of hybrid AN was out of the scope of [11], [12], [14],93
[16]–[18], [22]. Although the hybrid AN design was proposed94
in [23], the topic of energy-harvesting was not considered.95
On the contrary, we take into account security and energy-96
harvesting, then resolving the trade-off problem between97
these two aspects. Our contributions can be summarized as98
follows:99
• We propose a secure MIMO-OFDM SWIPT scheme in100
which the source node, Alice, employs a hybrid AN101
strategy to guarantee secure transmissions. In addition,102
a legitimate destination employs energy-harvesting cir-103
cuitry to gather energy (see Fig. 1). We turn the process104
of removing the cyclic prefix into the process of harvest-105
ing energy, thereby improving the amount of achievable106
energy at the intended user.107
• We consider two different optimization approaches. First,108
we maximize the secrecy rate of the system subject109
to the constraints of energy. Second, we maximize the110
harvested-energy rate at the legitimate energy-harvesting111
receiver subject to security constraints. As previously112
mentioned, we handle non-convex optimization problems113
by developing path-following algorithms to reach at least114
sub-optimal solutions.115
• We quantitatively evaluate the system performance in116
terms of security and energy-harvesting, respectively.117
Through numerical results, the impact of system para-118
meters is evaluated.119
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:120
Section II presents the system model and the specific setups at121
transceivers. Section III presents achievable secrecy rate and122
1As aforementioned, the SISO-OFDM in [18] does not provide any frame-
work to transform non-convex problems into convex programming problems
and thus, its approach fails to deal with the MIMO-OFDM case.
Fig. 1. System model.
its lower bound. In Section IV, the total amount of harvested 123
energy and its lower bound are derived. The two different max- 124
imization problems (i.e., maximizing the achievable secrecy
AQ:5
125
rate and maximizing the harvested energy) are suggested in 126
Section V. The numerical results and conclusions are provided 127
in Sections VI and VII, respectively. 128
Notation: Cm×n denotes the set of all complex matrices of 129
size m-by-n. {·} and {·} denote the real and imaginary 130
parts of a complex number. [·]m,n denotes the (m,n)th entry 131
of a matrix. (·)∗, (·) and (·)† denote the conjugate, trans- 132
pose and Hermitian operators, respectively. trace {·} denotes 133
the sum of the diagonal entries of a matrix. (A)⊥ is an 134
orthonormal basis for the null space of some matrix A, i.e., 135
A(A)⊥ = 0. ‖.‖ denotes the Euclidean norm of a vec- 136
tor. The expectation is denoted by E {·}. z ∼ CNn (0,Σ) 137
denotes a complex Gaussian random vector z ∈ Cn×1 138
with mean 0 and covariance matrix Σ ∈ Cn×n. Moreover, 139
z ∼ CN (0, σ2) denotes a complex Gaussian random vari- 140
able with zero-mean and covariance σ2. blkdiag {·} denotes 141
a block diagonal matrix with its diagonal elements being 142
matrices. The operator resizeij {a} resizes the vector a = 143
[a1, . . . , ai, . . . , aj, . . . , aM ] to the vector a′ = [ai, . . . , aj]. 144
II. SYSTEM MODEL 145
In this section, we respectively present the system model 146
and the specific setups at all nodes. The considered system 147
consists of one source node (Alice), one energy-harvesting 148
node (Bob), and one eavesdropper (Eve). Alice first converts 149
the frequency-domain signals into the time-domain signals 150
using an N -point inverse fast Fourier transform (IFFT), and 151
then inserts a cyclic prefix (CP) of Ncp length into the 152
beginning of each OFDM block. Let NA, NB and NE be the 153
number of antennas at Alice, Bob and Eve, respectively. 154
A. The Injection of Freq. AN and Temporal AN at Alice 155
Let an ∈ CNA×1 and Bn be, respectively, the beamforming 156
vector of subcarrier n and the frequency-domain AN precoding 157
matrix of subcarrier n. The frequency-domain symbol vector, 158
corresponding to the nth subcarrier, can be written as 159
sn = anxn + Bndn, 160
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where xn ∈ C is the frequency-domain symbol and dn is the161
injected freq. AN vector. To maximize the interference at Eve,162
dn is generated to be independent of dm if n = m. Moreover,163
each entry in dn is a complex Gaussian random variable with164
zero mean and covariance σ2. The size of Bn and that of dn165
will be determined later in Section II-D; however, the product166
Bndn must be a vector, which lies in CNA×1.167
As such, the frequency-domain symbol vector over all168
subcarriers can be written as169
s 
[
s1 , s

2 , . . . , s

N
]
= Xa + Bd (1)170
where171
X = blkdiag {INAx1, INAx2, . . . , INAxN} ,172
a =
[
a1 ,a

2 , . . . ,a

N
]
173
B = blkdiag {B1,B2, . . . ,BN} , (2)174
d =
[
d1 ,d

2 , . . . ,d

N
]
. (3)175
Remark 1: The covariance matrix of s can be calculated176
as:177
E
{
ss†
}
= E
{
Xaa†X†
}
+ E
{
Bdd†B†
}
178
= σ20blkdiag {W1,W2, . . . ,WN}+ σ2BB† (4)179
where Wn  wnw†n, wn 
√
pn
σ20
an and pn  E
{|xn|2}.180
Note that σ20 is a constant, which is used to adjust the range181
of the ratio (pn/σ20).182
In order to convert the array {sn}n=1,...,N into the183
time-domain signal, Alice uses the IFFT matrix F†A =184 (
F† ⊗ INA
) ∈ CNAN×NAN with F ∈ CN×N . Note that the185
(p, q)th element of F ∈ CN×N takes the value of [F]p,q =186 √
(1/N) exp (−j2πpq/N). After the conversion, Alice inserts187
a CP of Ncp samples into the beginning of that IFFT signal188
by using the following CP insertion matrix:189
TcpA =
[[
0NANcp×NA(N−Ncp), INANcp
]
, INAN
]
.190
As such, the transmitted signal in the time domain can be191
expressed as:192
s˜cp = TcpA F
†
As. (5)193
Let d˜ be the injected temporal AN vector, and let Q be194
the temporal AN precoding matrix. By adding s˜cp and Qd˜,195
we obtain the transmitted signal in the time domain, i.e.,196
s˜ = s˜cp + Qd˜ = TcpA F
†
As + Qd˜. (6)197
Note that the size of Q and the size of d˜ will be determined198
later in Section II-D. However, each entry of the vector d˜ will199
be assumed to obey CN
(
0, σ˜2
)
.200
Remark 2: The covariance matrix of the time-domain sig-201
nal s˜ can be calculated as:202
E
{
s˜s˜†
}
= TcpA F
†
A
(
σ20ww
† + σ2BB†
)
FA(T
cp
A )
† + σ˜2QQ†203
= σ20
[
TcpA F
†
Aww
†FA(T
cp
A )
† + Λ
]
(7)204
where205
Λ =
(
σ2/σ20
)
TcpA F
†
ABB
†FA(T
cp
A )
† +
(
σ˜2/σ20
)
QQ†206
and 207
w 
[
w1 , . . . ,w

N
]
. 208
Then, the average power of the time-domain signal s˜ is 209
E
{‖s˜‖2} = trace{E{s˜s˜†}} 210
= σ20 trace
{
TcpA F
†
Aww
†FA (T
cp
A )
† + Λ
}
211
= σ20
[∥∥∥TcpA F†Aw∥∥∥2 + trace {Λ}] . (8) 212
Denote PA as the power budget of Alice. A power constraint 213
is imposed on the signal s˜ as follows: 214
E
{‖s˜‖2} ≤ PA ⇔ ∥∥∥TcpA F†Aw∥∥∥2 ≤ PAσ20 − trace {Λ} . (9) 215
B. Information Processing at Eve 216
Eve first removes the CP from her received time-domain 217
OFDM signal by multiplying by the following CP removal 218
matrix: 219
RcpE =
[
0NEN×NENcp , INEN
]
. 220
Then, a FFT algorithm is applied to convert the time-domain 221
signals to the frequency-domain signals. This FFT algorithm is 222
performed by multiplying the FFT matrix FE = (F⊗ INE) ∈ 223
C
NEN×NEN
. As such, the frequency-domain received signal at 224
Eve can be given by 225
yE = FER
cp
E
(√
βEAH˜
cp
EA
)
s˜ + FEz˜E 226
=
√
βEAFER
cp
E H˜
cp
EAT
cp
A F
†
As 227
+
√
βEAFER
cp
E H˜
cp
EAQd˜ + FEz˜E (10) 228
where βEA represents the impact of the large-scale fading, 229
H˜cpEA ∈ CNE(N+Ncp)×NA(N+Ncp) represents the small-scale 230
fading, and H˜cpEA represents the time-domain channel impulse 231
response (CIR) matrix of the Eve-Alice link. Meanwhile, 232
z˜E ∈ CNEN×1 is the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) 233
vector with each element distributed as CN
(
0, σ20
)
. 234
We assume that there are LEA = L paths between Eve and 235
Alice. Note that the multi-path delay spread is equal to (L−1). 236
In order to avoid inter-block interference at a legitimate user, 237
it is required that the CP length is larger or equal to the multi- 238
path delay spread, i.e., Ncp ≥ L−1. Also note that Alice is not 239
aware of the Eve’s presence; thus, the setting Ncp ≥ L− 1 is 240
not originally intended for Eve, but rather for Bob. In practice, 241
Ncp is often assigned some fairly large number so that it will 242
be able to cover most channels. 243
For the lth (l ∈ {0, 2, . . . , L − 1}) path between Eve and 244
Alice, we denote GEAl ∈ CNE×NA be the time-domain fading 245
channel matrix. According to [24], [25], H˜cpEA is a block 246
circulant matrix and takes the following form: 247⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
GEA1 . . . OEA OEA . . . GEA2
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
GEAL . . . GEA1 OEA . . . OEAOEA . . . GEA2 GEA1 . . . OEA
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
OEA . . . OEA OEA . . . GEA1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ 248
where OEA  0NE×NA . 249
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Defining HEA  FERcpE H˜
cp
EAT
cp
A F
†
A and using the property250
of a circulant matrix,2 we can express HEA ∈ CNEN×NAN as251
a block-diagonal matrix, i.e.,252
HEA = blkdiag {HEA1 , . . . ,HEAn , . . . ,HEAN } (11)253
where HEAn =
∑L
l=1 GEAle
−j2πn(l−1)/N represents the fre-254
quency response of the Eve-Alice link at the nth subcarrier.255
Finally, (10) is rewritten as:256
yE =
√
βEAHEAs + FE
[√
βEAR
cp
E H˜
cp
EAQd˜ + z˜E
]
257
=
√
βEAHEA diag(a) [ x1, . . . , x1︸ ︷︷ ︸
NA elements
, . . . , xN , . . . , xN︸ ︷︷ ︸
NA elements
]258
+
√
βEAHEABd + FE
[√
βEAR
cp
E H˜
cp
EAQd˜ + z˜E
]
.259
(12)260
Let yEn be the nth subcarrier received signal. The ele-261
ments in yEn are also the entries in yE , beginning at index262
(n− 1)NE + 1 and ending at index nNE. We have263
yEn = resize(n− 1)NE + 1nNE {yE}264
=
[
0NE×(n−1)NE INE 0NE×(N−n)NE
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
CEn
yE265
=
√
βEACEnHEA (Xa + Bd)266
+CEnFE
[√
βEAR
cp
E H˜
cp
EAQd˜ + z˜E
]
267
=
√
βEAHEAnanxn +
√
βEAHEAnBndn268
+
√
βEACEnFER
cp
E H˜
cp
EAQd˜ + CEnFEz˜E (13)269
where the last equality is obtained by using block matrix mul-270
tiplication to shorten the first term CEnHEAXa and the second271
term CEnHEABd.272
C. Information Processing and Energy Harvesting at Bob273
Similar to the previous sub-section, the channel between274
Alice and Bob is a MIMO frequency selective fading channel275
with LBA paths. For simplicity, we also assume LBA = L. For276
the lth path between Bob and Alice, GBAl ∈ CNB×NA is the277
time-domain fading channel matrix.278
The employment of OFDM at Alice leads to the fact that279
each MIMO-OFDM transmission block can be viewed as N280
parallel frequency-domain MIMO channels. If Bob does not281
adopt any energy-harvesting scheme, the received frequency-282
domain signal at Bob (say yB,∅) would be formulated exactly283
the same way we attained (10)–(12), i.e.,284
yB,∅ = FBR
cp
B
(√
βBAH˜
cp
BA
)
TcpA F
†
As285
+FB
[
RcpB
(√
βBAH˜
cp
BA
)
Qd˜ + z˜B,∅
]
286
=
√
βBAHBAs + FB
[√
βBAR
cp
B H˜
cp
BAQd˜ + z˜B,∅
]
287
(14)288
where βBA represents the impact of the large-scale fading,289
H˜cpBA ∈ CNB(N+Ncp)×NA(N+Ncp) represents the small-scale290
2If a square matrix C is circulant, then it can be diagonalized by the FFT
matrix F and the IFFT matrix F†, i.e., FCF† is a diagonal matrix [25].
fading, and H˜cpBA represents the time-domain CIR matrix of 291
the Bob-Alice link. In (14), z˜B,∅ ∈ CNBN×1 is the AWGN 292
vector with each element distributed as CN
(
0, σ20
)
, the CP 293
removal matrix at Bob is RcpB =
[
0NBN×NBNcp , INBN
]
, and 294
HBA is defined as 295
HBA  FBRcpB H˜
cp
BAT
cp
A F
†
A 296
= blkdiag
{
HBA1 , . . . ,HBAn , . . . ,HBAN
}
(15) 297
with HBAn =
∑L
l=1GBAle
−j2πn(l−1)/N . 298
Bob is assumed to adopt the PS SWIPT scheme, 299
the received signal yB will be derived in a slightly different 300
way. Obviously, we have yB = yB,∅. A detailed description 301
of information processing and energy-harvesting at Bob will 302
be presented below.3 303
• The time duration of an OFDM block is divided into 304
three smaller portions: the first portion is from 0 to 305
τ cp = Ncpτs, the second portion is from τ cp to τ cp +Kτs 306
(with K ∈ {1, . . . , N}), and the remaining part is from 307
τ cp + Kτs to the end of the OFDM block duration 308
(i.e., Nτs). Herein, τs represents the sampling time (the 309
sampling rate is thus equal to 1/τs). 310
• The first portion is to remove the CP from the received 311
time-domain OFDM signal at Bob. In other words, 312
the first NBNcp elements of the vector H˜cpBAs˜ are not be 313
treated as information elements and will not go through 314
any information processing. Instead, these elements are 315
employed for the purpose of harvesting energy. Thus, 316
the energy harvested by Bob can be calculated as follows: 317
Ecp = ητ cp E
{∥∥∥resize1NBNcp{√βBAH˜cpBAs˜}∥∥∥2} (16) 318
where η ∈ [0, 1] is the energy conversion 319
efficiency of the energy-harvester circuit, and 320
Ccp 
[
INBNcp 0NBNcp×NBN
]
321
• During the second portion, Bob uses the PS SWIPT 322
scheme to decode information and harvest energy simul- 323
taneously. More specifically, the obtained signal is 324
divided into two streams based on a PS coefficient 325
ρ ∈ (0, 1]. For information processing, the received power 326
of one stream will be multiplied by the coefficient ρ. 327
Given that the multiplication of the received power by ρ 328
is equivalent to the multiplication of noise by 1/ρ, we can 329
express the received signal in the frequency domain (after 330
the FFT operation) as follows: 331
yB,1 332
= resize1NBK
{
FBR
cp
B
(√
βBAH˜
cp
BA
)
s˜ +
1√
ρ
FBz˜B,1
}
333
= C1
[√
βBAFBR
cp
B H˜
cp
BAs˜ +
1√
ρ
FBz˜B,1
]
334
=
√
βBAC1HBAs 335
+C1FB
[√
βBAR
cp
B H˜
cp
BAQd˜ +
1√
ρ
z˜B,1
]
(17) 336
3In [18], only SISO channels and temporal AN were discussed. In contrast,
our work extends SISO channels to MIMO channels and yet, the injection of
additional frequency-domain AN is also taken into account.
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where C1 
[
INBK 0NBK×NB(N−K)
]
and z˜B,1 ∈337
CNBN×1 is the AWGN vector with each element dis-338
tributed as CN
(
0, σ20
)
. In parallel, for energy-harvesting,339
the remaining stream will be transformed into energy. The340
harvested energy during this portion is given by341
EPS = η (Kτs) (1 − ρ)342
× E
{∥∥∥resize1NBK{RcpB (√βBAH˜cpBA) s˜}∥∥∥2} .343
(18)344
Different from yB,1 in (17), the term345
resize1NBK
{
RcpB
(√
βBAH˜
cp
BA
)
s˜
}
in (18) is the346
signal which does not go through information processing347
(thus, there is no noise term) as well as FFT operation.348
• During the third/last portion, Bob processes the signal349
in the same way as Eve does. Given that there are350
NB(N − K) samples left for this portion, the received351
signal from time τs + Kτs to time Nτs can be written352
as:353
yB,2 = resizeNB(K + 1)NBN
{√
βBAHBAs354
+FB
(
RcpB
(√
βBAH˜
cp
BA
)
Qd˜ + z˜B,2
)}
355
=
√
βBAC2HBAs356
+C2FB
[√
βBAR
cp
B H˜
cp
BAQd˜ + z˜B,2
]
(19)357
where C2 
[
0NB(N−K)×NBK INB(N−K)
]
and358
z˜B,2 ∈ CNBN×1 is the AWGN vector with each element359
distributed as CN
(
0, σ20
)
.360
In short, the received signal yB =
[
yB,1,y

B,2
]
at Bob can361
be given by362
yB =
[
C1
C2
]√
βBAHBA (Xa + Bd)363
+
[
C1
C2
]
FBR
cp
B
(√
βBAH˜
cp
BA
)
Qd˜364
+
[
C1FB 0NBK×NBN
0NB(N−K)×NBN C2FB
] [ 1√
ρ z˜B,1
z˜B,2
]
365
(a)
=
√
βBAHBA (Xa + Bd)366
+
√
βBAFBR
cp
B H˜
cp
BAQd˜ + CBAz˜B (20)367
where (a) is obtained by defining368
CBA 
[
C1FB 0NBK×NBN
0NB(N−K)×NBN C2FB
]
,369
z˜B 
[ 1√
ρ z˜B,1
z˜B,2
]
∼ CN2 NBN (0,J)370
with J =
[
(1/ρ)σ20INBN 0NBN
0NBN σ
2
0INBN
]
,371
and using the fact that
[
C1
C2
]
≡ INBN . The covariance matrix 372
of CBAz˜B can be calculated as follows: 373
CBAJC
†
BA =
[
(1/ρ)σ20C1FBF
†
BC
†
1 0
0 σ20C2FBF
†
BC
†
2
]
374
=
[
(1/ρ)σ20INBK 0
0 σ20INB(N−K)
]
(21) 375
where the last equality follows that FBF†B = INBN , 376
C1C
†
1 = INBK and C2C
†
2 = INB(N−K). 377
Let yBn be the nth subcarrier received signal. We have 378
yBn = resize(n− 1)NB + 1nNB {yB} 379
=
[
0NB×(n−1)NB INB 0NB×(N−n)NB
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
CBn
yB 380
= CBnyB. (22) 381
D. AN Design at Alice to Cancel Interference at Bob 382
As seen in (20), the presence of AN terms d and d˜ causes 383
interference at Bob. To cancel the interference, Alice can 384
design B and Q subject to 385{
HBAB = 0
RcpB H˜
cp
BAQ = 0.
(23) 386
Using (2) and (15), we can find out the solution B to the 387
equation HBAB = 0 as follows: 388
HBAB = 0 ⇔ blkdiag {HBA1B1, . . . ,HBANBN} = 0 389
⇔ Bn = H⊥BAn , ∀n ∈ {1, . . . , N}. (24) 390
Now it is obvious that B = blkdiag {B1, . . . ,BN} = 391
blkdiag
{
H⊥BA1 , . . . ,H
⊥
BAN
}
is a matrix with NAN rows and 392
(NA − NB)N columns due to Bn ∈ CNA×(NA−NB). The 393
existence of B, in general, depends on the existence of all 394
elements {Bn}Nn=1. Each Bn exists if and only if its second 395
dimension is positive, i.e., 396
NA −NB > 0 ⇔ NB < NA. (25) 397
Likewise, we deduce Q ∈ CNA(N+Ncp)×(NA(N+Ncp)−r) with 398
r = rank
(
RcpB H˜
cp
BA
)
= min{NBN,NA(N + Ncp)}. For the 399
existence of Q, it is required to have the condition NA(N + 400
Ncp)− r > 0, which leads to 401
r = NBN ⇔ NBN < NA(N + Ncp). (26) 402
Note that once (25) has been satisfied, (26) will be satisfied as 403
well. Thus, the case of NA > NB is taken into account in this 404
paper. Then, we will be able to design Bn ∈ CNA×(NA−NB), 405
dn ∈ C(NA−NB)×1, Q ∈ CNA(N+Ncp)×(NA(N+Ncp)−NBN) and 406
d˜ ∈ C(NA(N+Ncp)−NBN)×1. 407
Substituting (23) into (20) and (22), we can rewrite 408
yB =
√
βBAHBAXa + CBAz˜B 409
=
√
βBAHBA diag (a) [ x1, . . . , x1︸ ︷︷ ︸
NA elements
, . . . , xN , . . . , xN︸ ︷︷ ︸
NA elements
] 410
+CBAz˜B (27) 411
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TABLE I
A TABLE OF FREQUENTLY-USED SYMBOLS
and412
yBn =
√
βBACBnHBAXa + CBnCBAz˜B413
(a)
=
√
βBAHBAnanxn + CBnCBAz˜B (28)414
where (a) is obtained by using block matrix multiplication to415
calculate the product CBnHBAXa. The covariance matrix of416
CBnCBAz˜B can be calculated as:417
CBn
(
CBAJC
†
BA
)
C†Bn = (1/n)σ
2
0INB418
where n =
{
ρ if 1 ≤ n ≤ K
1 if K + 1 ≤ n ≤ N . (29)419
For readability, we present a table of symbols, Table I, at the420
top of the next page.421
III. ACHIEVABLE SECRECY RATE422
In this section, we formulate the achievable secrecy rate,423
which is the lower-bound of the capacity difference between424
the Bob-Alice link and the Eve-Alice link.425
A. Mutual Information Between Bob and Alice426
Let IBAn (yBn ;xn) (or simply IBAn) be the mutual infor-427
mation of the nth MIMO-OFDM subcarrier between Bob and428
Alice. From (28), IBAn (yBn ;xn) (in nats/OFDM block) can429
be expressed as [26]:430
IBAn (yBn ;xn) ≡ IBAn431
= ln det
(
INB +
(√
βBAHBAn
)
anE
{|xn|2}a†n432
×
(√
βBAHBAn
)†(σ20
n
INB
)−1)
= ln
(
1 +
∥∥√βBAHBAnwn∥∥2
(1/n)
)
(30)433
where wn 
√
E{|xn|2}
σ20
an =
√
pn
σ20
an.434
Let IBA (yB; {xn}n=1,...,N ) (or simply IBA) be the total 435
mutual information of the MIMO-OFDM subcarriers between 436
Bob and Alice. From (27), we have [27] 437
IBA = ln det
(
INBN +
√
βBAHBA diag (a) 438
× diag ( p1, . . . , p1︸ ︷︷ ︸
NA elements
, . . . , pN , . . . , pN︸ ︷︷ ︸
NA elements
) 439
×
(√
βBAHBA diag (a)
)† (
CBAJC
†
BA
)−1 )
440
(a)
= ln det
(
INBN + blkdiag
(
1βBAHBA1W1HBA1
†, 441
. . . , NβBAHBANWNHBAN
†
))
442
=
N∑
n=1
IBAn (31) 443
where (a) is obtained by using (21) and the sub- 444
stitutions of HBA = blkdiag
{
HBA1 , . . . ,HBAN
}
and 445
Wn = (pn/σ20)ana†n. 446
B. Mutual Information Between Eve and Alice 447
From (13), the mutual information (in nats/OFDM block) 448
of the nth MIMO-OFDM subcarrier between Eve and Alice 449
can be expressed as follows: 450
IEAn (yEn ;xn) = IEAn 451
= ln det
(
INE +
(√
βEAHEAn
)
anE
{|xn|2} a†n 452
×
(√
βEAHEAn
)† (
σ20Ξn
)−1 )
453
= ln
(
1 + βEAw†nH
†
EAnΞ
−1
n HEAnwn
)
(32) 454
where 455
Ξn  (σ2/σ20)βEAHEAnBnB†nH†EAn 456
+CEn
[
(σ˜2/σ20)βEAEE
† + INEN
]
C†En , 457
E  FERcpE H˜
cp
EAQ. 458
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Note that Ξn is a positive definite matrix we can make singular459
value decomposition Ξn = VnDnV†n with a nonegative460
diagonal matrix Dn and unitary matrix Vn. Then461
Ξ−1n = VnD
−1/2
n
(
VnD−1/2n
)†
462
and IEAn in (32) is expressed as463
IEAn = ln
(
1 + βEAw†nH
†
EAnVnD
−1/2
n464
×
(
D−1/2n V
†
nHEAnwn
))
465
= ln
(
1 +
∥∥∥√βEAD−1/2n V†nHEAnwn∥∥∥2) . (33)466
Meanwhile, the total mutual information IEA (in467
nats/OFDM block) of all MIMO-OFDM subcarriers between468
Eve and Alice can be deduced from (12) as follows:469
IEA = ln det
(
INEN +
√
βEAHEA diag(a)470
× diag ( p1, . . . , p1︸ ︷︷ ︸
NA elements
, . . . , pN , . . . , pN︸ ︷︷ ︸
NA elements
)471
×
(√
βEAHEA diag(a)
)† (
σ20Ξ
)−1 )
472
(a)
= ln det
(
INEN + blkdiag
{
βEAHEA1W1H
†
EA1Ξ
−1
1 ,473
. . . , βEAHEANWNH
†
EAN Ξ
−1
N
} )
474
=
N∑
n=1
IEAn (34)475
where476
Ξ =
σ2
σ20
βEAHEABB†H
†
EA +
σ˜2
σ20
βEAEE† + INEN477
= (σ2/σ20)βEAblkdiag
{
HEA1B1B
†
1H
†
EA1 ,478
. . . ,HEANBNB
†
NH
†
EAN
}
479
+(σ˜2/σ20)βEAEE
† + INEN480
= blkdiag {Ξ1, . . . ,ΞN} .481
The equality (a) is obtained by using the fact that482
Ξ−1 = blkdiag
{
Ξ−11 , . . . ,Ξ
−1
N
}
.483
IV. HARVESTED ENERGY484
In this section, we present the total energy that Bob harvests485
during the first and second portions.486
Firstly, the harvested energy during the first portion can be487
calculated from (16) as follows:488
Ecp = ητ cpβBA trace
{
CcpH˜cpBAE
{
s˜s˜†
}(
CcpH˜cpBA
)†}
489
= ητ cpσ20
[ ∥∥∥√βBAΥcpTcpA F†Aw∥∥∥2490
+trace
{
Υcp (βBAΛ) (Υcp)
†
} ]
(35)491
where Υcp = CcpH˜cpBA. Secondly, from (18) we can also492
calculate the harvested energy during the second portion as493
follows: 494
EPS = η(Kτs)(1 − ρ)βBAE
{∥∥∥resize1NBK{RcpBH˜cpBA˜s}∥∥∥2} 495
= ηKτs(1− ρ)βBA 496
× trace
{
C1R
cp
B H˜
cp
BAE
{
s˜s˜†
}(
C1R
cp
B H˜
cp
BA
)†}
497
= η (Kτs) (1− ρ) 498
× σ20
[ ∥∥∥√βBAΥPSTcpA F†Aw∥∥∥2 499
+trace
{
ΥPS (βBAΛ)
(
ΥPS
)†}] (36) 500
where ΥPS = C1RcpB H˜
cp
BA. Then, the total harvested energy 501
can be given by 502
Etotal (ρ,w) = Ecp + EPS 503
= σ20
[
− ρE1 + E2 +
∥∥∥√βBAΓ1w∥∥∥2 504
+(1− ρ)
∥∥∥√βBAΓ2w∥∥∥2 ] 505
= σ20
[
−ρE1 + E2 +
∥∥∥√βBAMw∥∥∥2 506
−ρ
∥∥∥√βBAΓ2w∥∥∥2] (37) 507
where 508
2E1 = ηKτstrace
{
ΥPS (βBAΛ)
(
ΥPS
)†}
, (38a) 509
E2 = E1 + ητ cptrace
{
Υcp (βBAΛ) (Υcp)
†}
, (38b) 510
Γ1 =
√
ητ cp ΥcpTcpA F
†
A, (38c) 511
Γ2 =
√
ηKτs ΥPST
cp
A F
†
A, (38d) 512
M = M† =
(
Γ†1Γ1 + Γ
†
2Γ2
)1/2
. (38e) 513
V. TRADE-OFF PROBLEM FORMULATION 514
This section tackles the trade-off problems between the 515
secure performance and the total harvested energy. Such trade- 516
off problems will be presented in terms of optimization prob- 517
lems. For the purpose of comparing the performance of the 518
system, we propose the following two maximization problems: 519
• Maximizing the difference 520
Δ(ρ,w) = IBA − IEA =
∑N
n=1 IBAn −
∑N
n=1 IEAn 521
(39) 522
subject to Etotal-based and power-based constraints. 523
Herein, it must be noted that the achievable secrecy rate 524
Rsec will be calculated as 525
Rsec = max{0,Δ(ρ,w)}. (40) 526
Due to this relation, we only need to focus on Δ(ρ,w) 527
rather than Rsec. In short, our first problem is to 528
maximize
ρ,w
Δ(ρ,w) (41a) 529
subject to Etotal (ρ,w) ≥ E0, (41b) 530
and (9). (41c) 531
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• Maximizing the total harvested energy Etotal (ρ,w) sub-532
ject to Δ-based and power-based constraints. In particu-533
lar, our second problem is to534
2 maximize
ρ,w
Etotal (ρ,w) (42a)535
subject to Δ(ρ,w) ≥ Δ0, (42b)536
and (9). (42c)537
Note that E0 in (41b) and Δ0 in (42b) are the desired energy538
and the desired secrecy rate, respectively. These two quantities539
reflect the quality-of-service of our secure scheme, and their540
values are pre-determined.541
A. Inner Convex Approximations for Non-Convex Problems542
The optimization problems (41) and (42) are non-convex543
because both the objective function Δ(ρ,w) in (39) and544
the objective function Etotal (ρ,w) in (37) are not concave,545
while both constraint (41b) and constraint (42b) are not546
convex. To address (41) and (42) we will employ inner convex547
approximation at each iteration. Let (ρ(κ),w(κ)) be a feasible548
point for (41) or (42), which is found at the (κ−1)th iteration.549
At the κth iteration, we will550
• Approximate Δ(ρ,w) in (39) by a lower bounding con-551
cave function Δ(κ)lower (ρ,w), which matches with Δ(ρ,w)552
at
(
ρ(κ),w(κ)
)
, i.e.553
Δ(ρ,w) ≥ Δ(κ)lower(ρ,w) ∀ (ρ,w) (43)554
and555
Δ(ρ(κ),w(κ)) = Δ(κ)lower(ρ
(κ),w(κ)). (44)556
• Approximate Etotal(ρ,w) in (37) by a lower bound-557
ing concave function E(κ)lower (ρ,w), which matches with558
Etotal (ρ,w) at
(
ρ(κ),w(κ)
)
, i.e.559
Etotal(ρ,w) ≥ E(κ)lower(ρ,w) ∀ (ρ,w), (45)560
and561
Etotal(ρ(κ),w(κ)) = E(κ)lower(ρ(κ),w(κ)). (46)562
• Innerly approximate the nonconvex constraints (41b) and563
(42b) by the convex constraint564
E(κ)lower (ρ,w) ≥ E0, (47)565
and566
Δ(κ)lower (ρ,w) ≥ Δ0, (48)567
respectively. Indeed, it follows from (43) and (45) that568
any feasible point for the convex constraint (47) ((48),569
resp.) is also feasible for the nonconvex constraint (41b)570
((42b), resp.).571
Proposition 1: Let x ∈ C, x¯ ∈ C, y > 0 and y¯ > 0. The572
inequality573
ln
(
1 +
|x|2
y
)
≥ ln
(
1 +
|x¯|2
y¯
)
− |x¯|
2
y¯
574
+2
{x¯∗x}
y¯
− |x¯|
2
y¯ (y¯ + |x¯|2)
(
y + |x|2)575
(49)576
holds true [9]. The RHS of (49) is a concave function [28]. 577
Proposition 2: For x > 0 and x¯ > 0, the inequality 578
ln(1 + x) ≤ ln(1 + x¯)− x¯
1 + x¯
+
x
1 + x¯
(50) 579
always holds true. The RHS of (50) is a convex function of x. 580
Note that (50) holds true because its RHS is the first-order 581
Taylor approximation of its left hand side (LHS), which is a 582
concave function [28]. 583
1) Obtaining Δ(κ)lower (ρ,w) : Applying Proposition 1 to 584
IBAn in (30) yields 585
IBAn ≥ ln
⎛⎜⎝1 +
∥∥∥√βBAHBAnw(κ)n ∥∥∥2
1
/

(κ)
n
⎞⎟⎠ 586
−
∥∥∥√βBAHBAnw(κ)n ∥∥∥2
1
/

(κ)
n
587
−
∥∥∥√βBAHBAnw(κ)n ∥∥∥2 ( 1n + ∥∥√βBAHBAnwn∥∥2)
1
/

(κ)
n
(
1
/

(κ)
n +
∥∥∥√βBAHBAnw(κ)n ∥∥∥2) 588
 f (κ) (wn, n) 589
=
{
f (κ) (wn, ρ) if 1 ≤ n ≤ K
f (κ) (wn, 1) if K + 1 ≤ n ≤ N
(51) 590
At the same time, applying Proposition 2 yields 591
IEAn ≤ ln
(
1 +
∥∥∥√βEAD−1/2n V†nHEAnw(κ)n ∥∥∥2) 592
−
∥∥∥√βEAD−1/2n V†nHEAnw(κ)n ∥∥∥2
1 +
∥∥∥√βEAD−1/2n V†nHEAnw(κ)n ∥∥∥2 593
+
∥∥∥√βEAD−1/2n V†nHEAnwn∥∥∥2
1 +
∥∥∥√βEAD−1/2n V†nHEAnw(κ)n ∥∥∥2 594
 g(κ+1) (wn) . (52) 595
Using (39), (51) and (52), the concave function 596
Δ(κ)lower (ρ,w) =
K∑
n=1
f (κ) (wn, ρ) +
N∑
n=K+1
f (κ) (wn, 1) 597
−
N∑
n=1
g(κ) (wn) (53) 598
satisfies (43) and (44) and thus is qualified as a lower bounding 599
approximation of Δlower(ρ,w). 600
2) Obtaining E(κ)lower (ρ,w) : Let M = [m1,m2, . . . ,mNAN ] 601
with mi being the ith column of M. One can derive the 602
following inequality: 603
‖Mw‖2 = ‖M†w‖2 =
NAN∑
i=1
∣∣∣m†iw∣∣∣2 604
≥ 2
NAN∑
i=1

{
(m†iw
(κ))∗(m†iw)
}
−
∥∥∥M†w(κ)∥∥∥2 605
 (1/βBA) ð(κ+1) (w) (54) 606
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over the trust region607
2
{
(m†iw
(κ))∗(m†iw)
}
−|m†iw(κ)|2>0, i = 1, . . . , NAN.608
(55)609
Substituting (54) into (37), we can obtain610
Etotal (ρ,w)611
≥ σ20
[
−ρE1 + E2 + ð(κ+1) (w)− ρ
∥∥∥√βBAΓ2w∥∥∥2]612
= σ20
[
E2 + ð(κ+1) (w)−
∥∥∥∥[ √E1√βBA Γ2w
]∥∥∥∥2
/
ρinv
]
613
 E(κ)lower (1/ρinv,w) (56)614
where615
ρinv 
1
ρ
≥ 1, (57)616
verifying (45) and (46), making E(κ)lower (1/ρinv,w) qualified as617
a lower bounding approximation of Etotal (ρ,w).618
3) Algorithms and Convergence: At the κ-th the iteration619
we solve the following convex optimization problems to620
generate the next feasible point
(
ρ
(κ+1)
inv ,w
(κ+1)
)
for (41) and621
(42), respectively:622
2 maximize
ρinv,w
Δ(κ)lower (1/ρinv,w) (58a)623
subject to E(κ)lower (1/ρinv,w) ≥ E0, (58b)624
(9), (55), (57) (58c)625
and626
2maximize
ρinv,w
E(κ)lower (1/ρinv,w) (59a)627
subject to Δ(κ+1)lower (1/ρinv,w) ≥ Δ0, (59b)628
(9), (55), (57). (59c)629
Note that the convex constraints (58b) and (59b) correspond630
to the convex constraints (47) and (48), respectively. Further-631
more, we have632
Δ(κ)lower(1/ρ
(κ+1)
inv ,w
(κ+1)) > Δ(κ)lower(1/ρ
(κ)
inv ,w
(κ)) (60)633
where (1/ρ(κ+1)inv ,w(κ+1)) is the optimal solution of (58) and634
(1/ρ(κ)inv ,w
(κ)) is a feasible point for (58), which together635
with (43) and (44) yield636
Δlower(1/ρ
(κ+1)
inv ,w
(κ+1)) ≥ Δ(κ)lower(1/ρ(κ+1)inv ,w(κ+1))637
> Δ(κ)lower(1/ρ
(κ)
inv ,w
(κ)), (61)638
i.e. (1/ρ(κ+1)inv ,w(κ+1)) is a better feasible point than639
(1/ρ(κ)inv ,w
(κ)) for (41). Therefore, Algorithm 1, which gen-640
erates the sequence {(1/ρ(κ)inv ,w(κ))}, at least converges to a641
locally optimal solution of (41) [9, Proposition 2]).642
Analogously, Algorithm 2 at least converges to a locally643
optimal solution of (42). Once initialized from an initial644
feasible point, both algorithms converge after a few iterations645
for a given error tolerance.646
Convergence: The problem (58) includes two variables ρ647
and w. Given that w is a vector of NAN complex elements,648
Algorithm 1 Path-Following Algorithm for (41)
1: Initialization: Set κ = 0 with an initial feasible point{
ρ
(0)
inv ,w
(0)
}
for (41) (see Appendix A).
2: repeat
3: At the (κ+1)th iteration, solve the inner convex approx-
imation problem (58) to obtain the optimal values ρ(κ+1)inv
and w(κ+1) of variables ρinv and w, respectively.
4: Reset κ := κ + 1.
5: until
∣∣∣∣Δ(κ+1)lower ( 1ρ(κ+1)inv ,w(κ+1)
)
−Δ(κ)lower
(
1
ρ
(κ)
inv
,w(κ)
)∣∣∣∣
converges.
6: return (ρ∗,w∗) =
(
1
/
ρ
(κ+1)
inv ,w
(κ+1)
)
as the desired
feasible point for (41).
Algorithm 2 Path-Following Algorithm for (42)
1: Initialization: Set κ = 0 with an initial feasible point{
ρ
(0)th
inv ,w
(0)th
}
for (42) (see Appendix B).
2: repeat
3: At the (κ+1)th iteration, solve the inner convex approx-
imation problem (59) to obtain the optimal values ρ(κ+1)inv
and w(κ+1) of variables ρinv and w, respectively.
4: Reset κ := κ + 1.
5: until
∣∣∣∣E(κ+1)lower ( 1ρ(κ+1)inv ,w(κ+1)
)
− E(κ)lower
(
1
ρ
(κ)
inv
,w(κ)
)∣∣∣∣
converges.
6: return (ρ∗,w∗) =
(
1
/
ρ
(κ+1)
inv ,w
(κ+1)
)
as the desired
feasible point for (42).
the total number of scalar variables is equal to 2 NAN + 1. 649
Herein, the real part and the imaginary part of each complex 650
element in w are considered as independent variables. The 651
number of quadratic constraints is equal to 
1 = 2. Thus, 652
the per-iteration computational complexity of Algorithm 1 is 653
O ((2 NAN + 1)2
2.51 + 
3.51 ) [29, Ch. 10]. Likewise, Algo- 654
rithm 2 is also invoked to resolve (59). With 2NAN+1 distinct 655
variables and 
2 = 2 quadratic constraints, the per-iteration 656
cost is O ((2 NAN + 1)2
2.52 + 
3.52 ). 657
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS 658
In this section, we provide numerical results to evaluate 659
the performance of proposed maximization problems. More 660
particularly, we draw the average curves of the achievable 661
secrecy rate Rsec (ρ,w) = max{0,Δ(ρ,w)} and the total 662
harvested energy Etotal (ρ,w) over numerous realizations of 663
βBA, βEA, {GBAl}Nl=1 and {GEAl}Nl=1. 664
While the realization of
{
βBA, {GBAl}Nl=1
}
implies the 665
instantaneous observation of the channel between Alice and 666
Bob, the realization of
{
βEA, {GEAl}Nl=1
}
corresponds to 667
instantaneous observation of the Alice-Eve channel at the 668
time of measurement. Note that Algorithm 1 and Algo- 669
rithm 2 are conducted in the case that βBA, βEA, {GBAl}Nl=1 670
and {GEAl}Nl=1 are given. Let {ρ,w} be one of the feasible 671
solutions after running Algorithm 1 (or Algorithm 2). Then, 672
our goals are to evaluate 673
Ravrsec = E{GBAl}Nl=1,{GEAl}Nl=1 {Rsec (ρ
∗,w∗)} , 674
Eavrtotal = E{GBAl}Nl=1,{GEAl}Nl=1 {Etotal (ρ
∗,w∗)} . 675
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Fig. 2. The convergence rate of the proposed algorithms. Other parameters:
N = 10, K = 2, and {PA, σ2,  σ2} = {30, 10, 10} dBm.
In short, the use of Algorithm 1 (or Algorithm 2, respectively)676
to solve (58) (or (59), respectively) yields a certain point677
{ρ,w}. Then, the substitution ρ = ρ,w = w into the678
expressions of Rsec and E will yield the instantaneous values679
at the time of measurement. Generating sufficiently large num-680
ber of realizations of βBA, βEA, {GBAl}Nl=1 and {GEAl}Nl=1,681
we can calculate the average values for the secrecy rate and682
harvested energy.683
In simulation, the time-domain fading channel matrices684
GBAl and GEAl can be assumed to be symmetric complex685
Gaussian random variables. More particularly, we assume686
GBAl ∼ CN (0, 1) and GEAl ∼ CN (0, 1) for ∀l ∈ {1, . . . , L}.687
The values of βBA and βEA rely on the rule of power688
degradation and the shadowing fading effect. For instance,689
if the distance between two transceivers is below 50 meters,690
the path loss can be around −90 dB. That may lead to691
βBA = 10(−90+SBA)/10, and βEA = 10(−90+SEA)/10 where SBA692
and SEA represent the shadowing. For simplicity, let us set693
SBA = SEA = 10. Other simulation parameters are as follows:694
Ncp = 3, NA = 6, NB = 3, NE = 4, L = 3, σ20 = −80 dBm,695
τs = 0.1 s, η = 80%, Δ0 = 0, and E0 = 20 σ20 .696
Fig. 2 illustrates the convergence rate for each of the697
proposed algorithms. It is not surprising that Algorithm 1 and698
Algorithm 2 converge within only 2 iterations because of699
the fact that (58) and (59) contain only quadratic and linear700
constraints.701
Fig. 3 shows the relation between Ravrsec and N . The largest702
value of Ravrsec is obtained at N = 11 in the case of Algorithm 1.703
Meanwhile, Ravrsec takes the largest value at N = 9 subcarriers704
in the case of Algorithm 2. The curve of Algorithm 1 shows an705
uptrend with N ∈ {5, . . . , 11} but start a strong downtrend at706
N = 12. While the curve of Algorithm 2 is in an uptrend707
with N ∈ {5, . . . , 9}, then slightly reducing at N = 10,708
increasing at N = 11 before reducing again at N = 12.709
Lastly, on average, Algorithm 1 provides higher secrecy rate710
than Algorithm 2.711
In Fig. 4, the relation between Eavrtotal and N is illustrated.712
We can see that Algorithm 1 is better than Algorithm 2 in713
terms of energy-harvesting. In fact, Eavrtotal in Algorithm 1 is714
Fig. 3. The achievable secrecy rate Rsec as a function of the
number of subcarriers N . Other system parameters: K = 2 and
{PA, σ2,  σ2} = {30, 10, 10} dBm.
higher than Eavrtotal in Algorithm 2 by the amount of above 715
30σ20 at each value of N ; however, the values of Eavrtotal in both 716
algorithms are nearly the same at N = 12. For Algorithm 1, 717
Eavrtotal increases with N ∈ {5, 6, 7} and decreases with 718
N ∈ {8, . . . , 12}. As for Algorithm 2, Eavrtotal reaches a peak 719
of Eavrtotal = 384σ20 when N = 9. 720
In order to achieve the balance between Ravrsec and Eavrtotal, 721
we observe Figs. 3–4 and suggest using either N = 8 for 722
Algorithm 1 or N = 9 for Algorithm 2. Note that the system 723
parameters used in these two figures are the same. Also 724
in Figs. 3–4, the gap between the two algorithms tends to 725
become closer when N increases. The curves are not increas- 726
ing/decreasing monotonic, but they fluctuate with respect 727
with N . 728
In Fig. 5, the relation between Ravrsec and K is shown. Ravrsec 729
in Algorithm 1 reaches the highest peak at K = 2 and 730
then steadily goes down; while Ravrsec in Algorithm 2 always 731
decreases with all values of K . When compared with each 732
other, the first proposed algorithm shows its superiority over 733
the other at K = {1, . . . , 4}, and both of algorithms reduce to 734
zero at K = {7, 8}. The curves in Fig. 5 suggest choosing a 735
small value of K to gain a satisfactory amount of the average 736
secrecy rate. 737
In Fig. 6, the relation between Eavrtotal and K is depicted. Once 738
again, Algorithm 1 is superior to Algorithm 2 at all integer 739
values of K , although the formulation of Algorithm 2 is 740
inherently intended for maximizing the harvested energy. 741
In reality, Algorithm 2 sometimes results in the instantaneously 742
harvested energy better than Algorithm 1 at some realization of 743
channels; however, on average, Eavrtotal in Algorithm 2 is much 744
lower than Eavrtotal in Algorithm 1. Noticeably, even when we 745
make use of the PS SWIPT scheme for all NBN informative 746
samples by setting K = N = 8, the amount of harvested 747
energy is not really among the highest ones, e.g. Eavrtotal at K = 8 748
is worse than at K = {2, 3, 4}. 749
It can be seen from Figs. 5–6 that Algorithm 1 brings 750
about much better system performance than Algorithm 2 in 751
terms of both security and energy. Thus, we suggest using 752
Algorithm 1 with the used parameters. Once Algorithm 1 has 753
been used, the best value of K is K = 2 because this value 754
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Fig. 4. The ratio of total harvested energy Eavrtotal to σ20 as a function
of the number of subcarriers N . Other system parameters: K = 2 and
{PA, σ2,  σ2} = {30, 10, 10} dBm.
Fig. 5. The achievable secrecy rate Rsec as a function of the parameter K .
Other system parameters: N = 8 and {PA, σ2,  σ2} = {30, 10, 10} dBm.
Fig. 6. The ratio of total harvested energy Eavrtotal to σ20 as a function
of the parameter K . Other system parameters: N = 8 and
{PA, σ2,  σ2} = {30, 10, 10} dBm.
can lead to a good balance between highly achievable Ravrsec and755
Eavrtotal, i.e.,
{
Ravrsec,
Eavrtotal
σ20
}
≈ {14.7 nats/OFDM block, 407.8} at756
K = 2.757
Fig. 7 shows that Algorithm 1 is superior to Algorithm 2 in758
terms of security in both considered sub-cases of. Regarding759
Algorithm 1, the changes in values are quite significant with760
PA ∈ (21, 28) dBm. Meanwhile, Algorithm 2 shows the761
slight difference between two sub-cases. When considering762
the first sub-case, one can see that the secure performance of763
Algorithm 1 is only slightly lower than Algorithm 2 at moder-764
ate PA ∈ (23, 25) dBm, but it is much higher than Algorithm 2765
Fig. 7. The ratio of total harvested energy Eavrtotal to σ20 as a function
of the parameter PA. Two sub-cases are considered. In the first sub-case,
we set {σ2,  σ2} = {−2, 0} dBm. The second sub-case, we set {σ2,  σ2} =
{−2, 3} dBm. Other system parameters: N = 7 and K = 3.
Fig. 8. The ratio of total harvested energy Eavrtotal to σ20 as a function
of the parameter PA. Two sub-cases are considered. In the first sub-
case, we set {σ2,  σ2} = {−2, 0} dBm. The second sub-case, we set
{σ2,  σ2} = {−2, 3} dBm. Other system parameters: N = 7 and K = 3.
Fig. 9. The ratio of total harvested energy Eavrtotal to σ20 as a function
of the parameter PA. Two sub-cases are considered. In the first sub-
case, we set {σ2,  σ2} = {−2, 0} dBm. The second sub-case, we set
{σ2,  σ2} = {2, 0} dBm. Other system parameters: N = 7 and K = 3.
at high PA. For the second sub-case, Algorithm 1 is almost 766
better than Algorithm 2 at all values of PA. 767
Fig. 8 shows that Eavrtotal increases with PA. Besides, 768
the achieved values of Eavrtotal in case 1 (with σ˜2 = 0 dBm) are 769
lower than those in case 2 (with σ˜2 = 3 dBm). Interestingly, 770
we can see that the larger σ˜2 (i.e., the more power we spend 771
on generating the temporal AN d˜), the more energy Bob can 772
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Fig. 10. The ratio of total harvested energy Eavrtotal to σ20 as a function
of the parameter PA. Two sub-cases are considered. In the first sub-
case, we set {σ2,  σ2} = {−2, 0} dBm. The second sub-case, we set
{σ2,  σ2} = {2, 0} dBm. Other system parameters: N = 7 and K = 3.
harvest. From Figs. 7–8, one can see that the difference in773
performance between Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 expands774
when PA increases.775
Both Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 confirm the superiority of776
Algorithm 1 over Algorithm 2 in terms of security and har-777
vested energy, especially at high PA. Moreover, Fig. 9 shows778
that the secure performance is not proportional to σ2. This779
means that assigning more power to the frequency-domain780
AN may not help improve security level. While the energy781
efficiency seems to be proportional to the increase in σ2 as782
shown in Fig. 10. When comparing Figs. 8 and 10, it is783
observed that in terms of energy, the power allocation for σ2784
(see Fig. 10) brings about worse performance than the power785
allocation for σ˜2 (see Fig. 8) does. This observation implies786
that instead of increasing σ2 by the amount of 4 dBm, it is787
preferable to increase σ˜2 by the amount of 3 dBm.788
VII. CONCLUSION789
In this paper, we have analyzed a MIMO-OFDM SWIPT790
network and proposed two types of maximization problems791
to improve secrecy rate and harvested energy, respectively.792
Two path-following iterative algorithms of low computational793
complexity have been also provided to solve two different non-794
convex problems, whereby the sub-optimal solutions (ρ∗,w∗)795
have been given. The impact of other key parameters, related796
to the aspects of security and energy-harvesting, have been also797
evaluated through numerical results. Overall, we observed that798
the system performance is not proportional to N , K , σ2 and799
σ˜2; thus the choice of these parameters will pose challenges800
to designers. In contrast, the system performance is enhanced801
with the increase in the power budget PA. Moreover, it will802
be the responsibility of designers to choose the most suitable803
algorithm, because each algorithm results in a different per-804
formance. With the used parameters in this paper, we suggest805
using Algorithm 1 because it is superior to Algorithm 2 in806
resolving the trade-off problem between security and energy-807
harvesting. In the future, it is worth considering the impact of808
non-linear EH models on the secure performance of MIMO-809
OFDM SWIPT networks since such models reflect better the810
practical utility of EH circuits/receivers. Borrowing the idea of811
using machine learning and EH history to predict renewable 812
energy generation trends [30], we can also consider making 813
predictions about the amount of information leakage for future 814
work. 815
APPENDIX 816
A. Locating an Initial Feasible Point for (41) 817
A feasible point for (41) must satisfy (41b) and (41c). 818
Due to the non-convexity of (41b), we invoke once again 819
the inner convex approximation by replacing Etotal (ρ,w) with 820
E(ϑ+1)lower (1/ρinv,w) at the (ϑ + 1)th iteration. In parallel, 821
the accompanying constraint (55) (in which κ must be replaced 822
with ϑ) are needed. In short, a feasible point for (41) can be 823
found by solving the following inner convex approximation 824
problem: 825
2 maximize
ρinv,w
1 (62a) 826
subject to E(ϑ+1)lower (1/ρinv,w) ≥ E0, (62b) 827
(9), (55), (57) (62c) 828
at the (ϑ + 1)th iteration. The above-proposed problem is to 829
find an initial feasible point for Algorithm 1, but this problem 830
itself requires an initial point to run. To find its own initial 831
point, we simply find (ρinv,w) satisfying (9), (55) and (57). 832
B. Locating an Initial Feasible Point for (42) 833
Similar to Appendix A, at the (ϑ + 1)th iteration, we need 834
to solve the following inner convex approximation problem to 835
find an initial feasible of (42): 836
2 maximize
ρinv,w
1 (63a) 837
subject to Δ(ϑ+1)lower (1/ρinv,w) ≥ Δ0, (63b) 838
(9), (57). (63c) 839
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Security and Energy Harvesting for
MIMO-OFDM Networks
Tiep M. Hoang , Ahmed El Shafie , Senior Member, IEEE,
Daniel Benevides da Costa , Senior Member, IEEE,
Trung Q. Duong , Senior Member, IEEE, Hoang Duong Tuan ,
and Alan Marshall , Senior Member, IEEE
Abstract— We consider a multiple-input multiple-output1
(MIMO) orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM)2
network in which a source node, Alice, communicates with an3
energy-harvesting destination node, Bob, in the presence of a4
passive eavesdropper. To secure the wireless transmission, Alice5
generates a hybrid artificial noise (AN) in both frequency and6
time domains. Moreover, in order to collect more energy, Bob7
splits the received signal power of the cyclic prefix of each OFDM8
block. We then propose two non-convex optimization problems9
to balance both the need for security and the need for harvesting10
energy at Bob. While one considers maximizing the secrecy rate,11
the other approach aims at maximizing the harvested energy.12
Path-following algorithms of low computational complexity are13
developed and evaluated. Our numerical results show the gain14
of our proposed scheme and the effectiveness of our proposed15
algorithms.16
Index Terms— MIMO, OFDM, SWIPT, security, energy17
harvesting, hybrid artificial noise, path-following algorithms.18
I. INTRODUCTION19
OVER the past decade, wireless security has been widely20 investigated since wireless networks are vulnerable to21
passive eavesdropping [2]–[5]. Harvesting energy in secure22
wireless networks has also drawn the research community’s23
attention recently [6]–[8]. Obviously, considering wireless24
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security and energy-harvesting is generally more challenging 25
than considering each problem separately [7], [9], [10]. 26
Many works have examined the impact of secrecy 27
parameters on the harvested energy and clarified the role of 28
energy-harvesting parameters on the physical-layer security 29
performance. For example, [11] considered a relaying network 30
and then designed beamforming vector and time-switching 31
(TS) coefficient to maximize secrecy rate subject to energy- 32
related constraints. Moreover, [12] focused on minimizing 33
the transmit power subject to rate-related constraints and 34
considered power-splitting (PS) protocol instead of TS pro- 35
tocol. Using the TS protocol for energy-harvesting and using 36
game theory to cope with jamming attacks, the authors of [13] 37
evaluated the secure performance of a wireless secret key 38
generation system. The results in [14] indicated that the secure 39
performance of a relaying network would be improved by 40
using a TS-based relaying protocol (instead of merely process- 41
ing information). Both the TS and PS protocols were discussed 42
in [15] with the emphasis on protecting a relaying network. 43
Furthermore, security and energy-harvesting for orthogonal 44
frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) systems were also 45
simultaneously studied in previous works [16]–[18]. However, 46
the proposed systems in [16] and [18] were single-input single- 47
output (SISO) systems, while [17] had to invoke a jammer to 48
cope with information leakage. Moreover, the methodologies 49
used in these works might not be extended to more general 50
cases such as multiple-input multiple-output (MIMO). Hav- 51
ing said that, the idea of using OFDM to simultaneously 52
improve security level and received energy in these works 53
is worth our consideration. For instance, [18] took advantage 54
of cyclic prefix, which is one of the most characteristics of 55
the OFDM technique, to improve the energy harvested at the 56
intended energy-harvesting user. Apart from the linear energy- 57
harvesting (EH) model, several non-linear EH models are 58
studied in [19]–[21]. In [19], the authors maximize the sum 59
throughput and the minimum individual throughput based on 60
the constraints of time and power allocation. From a hardware 61
design perspective, the authors in [20] and [21] consider 62
power conversion/transmission efficiency in connection with 63
EH circuits. Especially, the EH model in [21] includes the 64
sensitivity and saturation threshold of EH circuits. Such non- 65
linear EH models are relatively practical, but applying them to 66
secure wireless systems is really challenging. To simplify the 67
0090-6778 © 2019 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission.
See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
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analysis, we choose to use a linear EH model as in most of68
the existing works. Hence, the topic of non-linear EH models69
is out of the scope of our paper.70
Among the aforementioned works, our paper is closely71
related to [18]. In [18], the authors considered a SISO-72
OFDM simultaneous wireless information and power trans-73
fer (SWIPT) in the presence of a passive eavesdropper. As an74
extension of [18] to the MIMO case, this work considers75
a MIMO-OFDM SWPIT system. Noticeably, [18] suggests76
a non-convex problem for the trade-off between information77
security and energy-harvesting, but cannot solve it through78
any analytical methodology. In other words, the approach79
in [18] is unable to apply to similar works. In contrast, this80
paper provides a computational framework for resolving non-81
convex problems relating to the trade-off between security and82
energy-harvesting. Following that, we face the challenges in83
transforming non-convex problems into convex approxima-84
tion ones1. More specifically, to address these non-convex85
optimization problems, we develop path-following iterative86
algorithms, which iteratively improve feasible points for the87
original non-convex problems. Thereby, we obtain at least88
a sub-optimal solution to each of the proposed problems.89
It should also be noted that this paper simultaneously discusses90
the frequency-domain artificial noise (freq. AN) design and91
the time-domain artificial noise (temporal AN) design. This92
type of hybrid AN was out of the scope of [11], [12], [14],93
[16]–[18], [22]. Although the hybrid AN design was proposed94
in [23], the topic of energy-harvesting was not considered.95
On the contrary, we take into account security and energy-96
harvesting, then resolving the trade-off problem between97
these two aspects. Our contributions can be summarized as98
follows:99
• We propose a secure MIMO-OFDM SWIPT scheme in100
which the source node, Alice, employs a hybrid AN101
strategy to guarantee secure transmissions. In addition,102
a legitimate destination employs energy-harvesting cir-103
cuitry to gather energy (see Fig. 1). We turn the process104
of removing the cyclic prefix into the process of harvest-105
ing energy, thereby improving the amount of achievable106
energy at the intended user.107
• We consider two different optimization approaches. First,108
we maximize the secrecy rate of the system subject109
to the constraints of energy. Second, we maximize the110
harvested-energy rate at the legitimate energy-harvesting111
receiver subject to security constraints. As previously112
mentioned, we handle non-convex optimization problems113
by developing path-following algorithms to reach at least114
sub-optimal solutions.115
• We quantitatively evaluate the system performance in116
terms of security and energy-harvesting, respectively.117
Through numerical results, the impact of system para-118
meters is evaluated.119
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows:120
Section II presents the system model and the specific setups at121
transceivers. Section III presents achievable secrecy rate and122
1As aforementioned, the SISO-OFDM in [18] does not provide any frame-
work to transform non-convex problems into convex programming problems
and thus, its approach fails to deal with the MIMO-OFDM case.
Fig. 1. System model.
its lower bound. In Section IV, the total amount of harvested 123
energy and its lower bound are derived. The two different max- 124
imization problems (i.e., maximizing the achievable secrecy
AQ:5
125
rate and maximizing the harvested energy) are suggested in 126
Section V. The numerical results and conclusions are provided 127
in Sections VI and VII, respectively. 128
Notation: Cm×n denotes the set of all complex matrices of 129
size m-by-n. {·} and {·} denote the real and imaginary 130
parts of a complex number. [·]m,n denotes the (m,n)th entry 131
of a matrix. (·)∗, (·) and (·)† denote the conjugate, trans- 132
pose and Hermitian operators, respectively. trace {·} denotes 133
the sum of the diagonal entries of a matrix. (A)⊥ is an 134
orthonormal basis for the null space of some matrix A, i.e., 135
A(A)⊥ = 0. ‖.‖ denotes the Euclidean norm of a vec- 136
tor. The expectation is denoted by E {·}. z ∼ CNn (0,Σ) 137
denotes a complex Gaussian random vector z ∈ Cn×1 138
with mean 0 and covariance matrix Σ ∈ Cn×n. Moreover, 139
z ∼ CN (0, σ2) denotes a complex Gaussian random vari- 140
able with zero-mean and covariance σ2. blkdiag {·} denotes 141
a block diagonal matrix with its diagonal elements being 142
matrices. The operator resizeij {a} resizes the vector a = 143
[a1, . . . , ai, . . . , aj, . . . , aM ] to the vector a′ = [ai, . . . , aj]. 144
II. SYSTEM MODEL 145
In this section, we respectively present the system model 146
and the specific setups at all nodes. The considered system 147
consists of one source node (Alice), one energy-harvesting 148
node (Bob), and one eavesdropper (Eve). Alice first converts 149
the frequency-domain signals into the time-domain signals 150
using an N -point inverse fast Fourier transform (IFFT), and 151
then inserts a cyclic prefix (CP) of Ncp length into the 152
beginning of each OFDM block. Let NA, NB and NE be the 153
number of antennas at Alice, Bob and Eve, respectively. 154
A. The Injection of Freq. AN and Temporal AN at Alice 155
Let an ∈ CNA×1 and Bn be, respectively, the beamforming 156
vector of subcarrier n and the frequency-domain AN precoding 157
matrix of subcarrier n. The frequency-domain symbol vector, 158
corresponding to the nth subcarrier, can be written as 159
sn = anxn + Bndn, 160
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where xn ∈ C is the frequency-domain symbol and dn is the161
injected freq. AN vector. To maximize the interference at Eve,162
dn is generated to be independent of dm if n = m. Moreover,163
each entry in dn is a complex Gaussian random variable with164
zero mean and covariance σ2. The size of Bn and that of dn165
will be determined later in Section II-D; however, the product166
Bndn must be a vector, which lies in CNA×1.167
As such, the frequency-domain symbol vector over all168
subcarriers can be written as169
s 
[
s1 , s

2 , . . . , s

N
]
= Xa + Bd (1)170
where171
X = blkdiag {INAx1, INAx2, . . . , INAxN} ,172
a =
[
a1 ,a

2 , . . . ,a

N
]
173
B = blkdiag {B1,B2, . . . ,BN} , (2)174
d =
[
d1 ,d

2 , . . . ,d

N
]
. (3)175
Remark 1: The covariance matrix of s can be calculated176
as:177
E
{
ss†
}
= E
{
Xaa†X†
}
+ E
{
Bdd†B†
}
178
= σ20blkdiag {W1,W2, . . . ,WN}+ σ2BB† (4)179
where Wn  wnw†n, wn 
√
pn
σ20
an and pn  E
{|xn|2}.180
Note that σ20 is a constant, which is used to adjust the range181
of the ratio (pn/σ20).182
In order to convert the array {sn}n=1,...,N into the183
time-domain signal, Alice uses the IFFT matrix F†A =184 (
F† ⊗ INA
) ∈ CNAN×NAN with F ∈ CN×N . Note that the185
(p, q)th element of F ∈ CN×N takes the value of [F]p,q =186 √
(1/N) exp (−j2πpq/N). After the conversion, Alice inserts187
a CP of Ncp samples into the beginning of that IFFT signal188
by using the following CP insertion matrix:189
TcpA =
[[
0NANcp×NA(N−Ncp), INANcp
]
, INAN
]
.190
As such, the transmitted signal in the time domain can be191
expressed as:192
s˜cp = TcpA F
†
As. (5)193
Let d˜ be the injected temporal AN vector, and let Q be194
the temporal AN precoding matrix. By adding s˜cp and Qd˜,195
we obtain the transmitted signal in the time domain, i.e.,196
s˜ = s˜cp + Qd˜ = TcpA F
†
As + Qd˜. (6)197
Note that the size of Q and the size of d˜ will be determined198
later in Section II-D. However, each entry of the vector d˜ will199
be assumed to obey CN
(
0, σ˜2
)
.200
Remark 2: The covariance matrix of the time-domain sig-201
nal s˜ can be calculated as:202
E
{
s˜s˜†
}
= TcpA F
†
A
(
σ20ww
† + σ2BB†
)
FA(T
cp
A )
† + σ˜2QQ†203
= σ20
[
TcpA F
†
Aww
†FA(T
cp
A )
† + Λ
]
(7)204
where205
Λ =
(
σ2/σ20
)
TcpA F
†
ABB
†FA(T
cp
A )
† +
(
σ˜2/σ20
)
QQ†206
and 207
w 
[
w1 , . . . ,w

N
]
. 208
Then, the average power of the time-domain signal s˜ is 209
E
{‖s˜‖2} = trace{E{s˜s˜†}} 210
= σ20 trace
{
TcpA F
†
Aww
†FA (T
cp
A )
† + Λ
}
211
= σ20
[∥∥∥TcpA F†Aw∥∥∥2 + trace {Λ}] . (8) 212
Denote PA as the power budget of Alice. A power constraint 213
is imposed on the signal s˜ as follows: 214
E
{‖s˜‖2} ≤ PA ⇔ ∥∥∥TcpA F†Aw∥∥∥2 ≤ PAσ20 − trace {Λ} . (9) 215
B. Information Processing at Eve 216
Eve first removes the CP from her received time-domain 217
OFDM signal by multiplying by the following CP removal 218
matrix: 219
RcpE =
[
0NEN×NENcp , INEN
]
. 220
Then, a FFT algorithm is applied to convert the time-domain 221
signals to the frequency-domain signals. This FFT algorithm is 222
performed by multiplying the FFT matrix FE = (F⊗ INE) ∈ 223
C
NEN×NEN
. As such, the frequency-domain received signal at 224
Eve can be given by 225
yE = FER
cp
E
(√
βEAH˜
cp
EA
)
s˜ + FEz˜E 226
=
√
βEAFER
cp
E H˜
cp
EAT
cp
A F
†
As 227
+
√
βEAFER
cp
E H˜
cp
EAQd˜ + FEz˜E (10) 228
where βEA represents the impact of the large-scale fading, 229
H˜cpEA ∈ CNE(N+Ncp)×NA(N+Ncp) represents the small-scale 230
fading, and H˜cpEA represents the time-domain channel impulse 231
response (CIR) matrix of the Eve-Alice link. Meanwhile, 232
z˜E ∈ CNEN×1 is the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) 233
vector with each element distributed as CN
(
0, σ20
)
. 234
We assume that there are LEA = L paths between Eve and 235
Alice. Note that the multi-path delay spread is equal to (L−1). 236
In order to avoid inter-block interference at a legitimate user, 237
it is required that the CP length is larger or equal to the multi- 238
path delay spread, i.e., Ncp ≥ L−1. Also note that Alice is not 239
aware of the Eve’s presence; thus, the setting Ncp ≥ L− 1 is 240
not originally intended for Eve, but rather for Bob. In practice, 241
Ncp is often assigned some fairly large number so that it will 242
be able to cover most channels. 243
For the lth (l ∈ {0, 2, . . . , L − 1}) path between Eve and 244
Alice, we denote GEAl ∈ CNE×NA be the time-domain fading 245
channel matrix. According to [24], [25], H˜cpEA is a block 246
circulant matrix and takes the following form: 247⎡⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎢⎣
GEA1 . . . OEA OEA . . . GEA2
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
GEAL . . . GEA1 OEA . . . OEAOEA . . . GEA2 GEA1 . . . OEA
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
OEA . . . OEA OEA . . . GEA1
⎤⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎥⎦ 248
where OEA  0NE×NA . 249
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Defining HEA  FERcpE H˜
cp
EAT
cp
A F
†
A and using the property250
of a circulant matrix,2 we can express HEA ∈ CNEN×NAN as251
a block-diagonal matrix, i.e.,252
HEA = blkdiag {HEA1 , . . . ,HEAn , . . . ,HEAN } (11)253
where HEAn =
∑L
l=1 GEAle
−j2πn(l−1)/N represents the fre-254
quency response of the Eve-Alice link at the nth subcarrier.255
Finally, (10) is rewritten as:256
yE =
√
βEAHEAs + FE
[√
βEAR
cp
E H˜
cp
EAQd˜ + z˜E
]
257
=
√
βEAHEA diag(a) [ x1, . . . , x1︸ ︷︷ ︸
NA elements
, . . . , xN , . . . , xN︸ ︷︷ ︸
NA elements
]258
+
√
βEAHEABd + FE
[√
βEAR
cp
E H˜
cp
EAQd˜ + z˜E
]
.259
(12)260
Let yEn be the nth subcarrier received signal. The ele-261
ments in yEn are also the entries in yE , beginning at index262
(n− 1)NE + 1 and ending at index nNE. We have263
yEn = resize(n− 1)NE + 1nNE {yE}264
=
[
0NE×(n−1)NE INE 0NE×(N−n)NE
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
CEn
yE265
=
√
βEACEnHEA (Xa + Bd)266
+CEnFE
[√
βEAR
cp
E H˜
cp
EAQd˜ + z˜E
]
267
=
√
βEAHEAnanxn +
√
βEAHEAnBndn268
+
√
βEACEnFER
cp
E H˜
cp
EAQd˜ + CEnFEz˜E (13)269
where the last equality is obtained by using block matrix mul-270
tiplication to shorten the first term CEnHEAXa and the second271
term CEnHEABd.272
C. Information Processing and Energy Harvesting at Bob273
Similar to the previous sub-section, the channel between274
Alice and Bob is a MIMO frequency selective fading channel275
with LBA paths. For simplicity, we also assume LBA = L. For276
the lth path between Bob and Alice, GBAl ∈ CNB×NA is the277
time-domain fading channel matrix.278
The employment of OFDM at Alice leads to the fact that279
each MIMO-OFDM transmission block can be viewed as N280
parallel frequency-domain MIMO channels. If Bob does not281
adopt any energy-harvesting scheme, the received frequency-282
domain signal at Bob (say yB,∅) would be formulated exactly283
the same way we attained (10)–(12), i.e.,284
yB,∅ = FBR
cp
B
(√
βBAH˜
cp
BA
)
TcpA F
†
As285
+FB
[
RcpB
(√
βBAH˜
cp
BA
)
Qd˜ + z˜B,∅
]
286
=
√
βBAHBAs + FB
[√
βBAR
cp
B H˜
cp
BAQd˜ + z˜B,∅
]
287
(14)288
where βBA represents the impact of the large-scale fading,289
H˜cpBA ∈ CNB(N+Ncp)×NA(N+Ncp) represents the small-scale290
2If a square matrix C is circulant, then it can be diagonalized by the FFT
matrix F and the IFFT matrix F†, i.e., FCF† is a diagonal matrix [25].
fading, and H˜cpBA represents the time-domain CIR matrix of 291
the Bob-Alice link. In (14), z˜B,∅ ∈ CNBN×1 is the AWGN 292
vector with each element distributed as CN
(
0, σ20
)
, the CP 293
removal matrix at Bob is RcpB =
[
0NBN×NBNcp , INBN
]
, and 294
HBA is defined as 295
HBA  FBRcpB H˜
cp
BAT
cp
A F
†
A 296
= blkdiag
{
HBA1 , . . . ,HBAn , . . . ,HBAN
}
(15) 297
with HBAn =
∑L
l=1GBAle
−j2πn(l−1)/N . 298
Bob is assumed to adopt the PS SWIPT scheme, 299
the received signal yB will be derived in a slightly different 300
way. Obviously, we have yB = yB,∅. A detailed description 301
of information processing and energy-harvesting at Bob will 302
be presented below.3 303
• The time duration of an OFDM block is divided into 304
three smaller portions: the first portion is from 0 to 305
τ cp = Ncpτs, the second portion is from τ cp to τ cp +Kτs 306
(with K ∈ {1, . . . , N}), and the remaining part is from 307
τ cp + Kτs to the end of the OFDM block duration 308
(i.e., Nτs). Herein, τs represents the sampling time (the 309
sampling rate is thus equal to 1/τs). 310
• The first portion is to remove the CP from the received 311
time-domain OFDM signal at Bob. In other words, 312
the first NBNcp elements of the vector H˜cpBAs˜ are not be 313
treated as information elements and will not go through 314
any information processing. Instead, these elements are 315
employed for the purpose of harvesting energy. Thus, 316
the energy harvested by Bob can be calculated as follows: 317
Ecp = ητ cp E
{∥∥∥resize1NBNcp{√βBAH˜cpBAs˜}∥∥∥2} (16) 318
where η ∈ [0, 1] is the energy conversion 319
efficiency of the energy-harvester circuit, and 320
Ccp 
[
INBNcp 0NBNcp×NBN
]
321
• During the second portion, Bob uses the PS SWIPT 322
scheme to decode information and harvest energy simul- 323
taneously. More specifically, the obtained signal is 324
divided into two streams based on a PS coefficient 325
ρ ∈ (0, 1]. For information processing, the received power 326
of one stream will be multiplied by the coefficient ρ. 327
Given that the multiplication of the received power by ρ 328
is equivalent to the multiplication of noise by 1/ρ, we can 329
express the received signal in the frequency domain (after 330
the FFT operation) as follows: 331
yB,1 332
= resize1NBK
{
FBR
cp
B
(√
βBAH˜
cp
BA
)
s˜ +
1√
ρ
FBz˜B,1
}
333
= C1
[√
βBAFBR
cp
B H˜
cp
BAs˜ +
1√
ρ
FBz˜B,1
]
334
=
√
βBAC1HBAs 335
+C1FB
[√
βBAR
cp
B H˜
cp
BAQd˜ +
1√
ρ
z˜B,1
]
(17) 336
3In [18], only SISO channels and temporal AN were discussed. In contrast,
our work extends SISO channels to MIMO channels and yet, the injection of
additional frequency-domain AN is also taken into account.
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where C1 
[
INBK 0NBK×NB(N−K)
]
and z˜B,1 ∈337
CNBN×1 is the AWGN vector with each element dis-338
tributed as CN
(
0, σ20
)
. In parallel, for energy-harvesting,339
the remaining stream will be transformed into energy. The340
harvested energy during this portion is given by341
EPS = η (Kτs) (1 − ρ)342
× E
{∥∥∥resize1NBK{RcpB (√βBAH˜cpBA) s˜}∥∥∥2} .343
(18)344
Different from yB,1 in (17), the term345
resize1NBK
{
RcpB
(√
βBAH˜
cp
BA
)
s˜
}
in (18) is the346
signal which does not go through information processing347
(thus, there is no noise term) as well as FFT operation.348
• During the third/last portion, Bob processes the signal349
in the same way as Eve does. Given that there are350
NB(N − K) samples left for this portion, the received351
signal from time τs + Kτs to time Nτs can be written352
as:353
yB,2 = resizeNB(K + 1)NBN
{√
βBAHBAs354
+FB
(
RcpB
(√
βBAH˜
cp
BA
)
Qd˜ + z˜B,2
)}
355
=
√
βBAC2HBAs356
+C2FB
[√
βBAR
cp
B H˜
cp
BAQd˜ + z˜B,2
]
(19)357
where C2 
[
0NB(N−K)×NBK INB(N−K)
]
and358
z˜B,2 ∈ CNBN×1 is the AWGN vector with each element359
distributed as CN
(
0, σ20
)
.360
In short, the received signal yB =
[
yB,1,y

B,2
]
at Bob can361
be given by362
yB =
[
C1
C2
]√
βBAHBA (Xa + Bd)363
+
[
C1
C2
]
FBR
cp
B
(√
βBAH˜
cp
BA
)
Qd˜364
+
[
C1FB 0NBK×NBN
0NB(N−K)×NBN C2FB
] [ 1√
ρ z˜B,1
z˜B,2
]
365
(a)
=
√
βBAHBA (Xa + Bd)366
+
√
βBAFBR
cp
B H˜
cp
BAQd˜ + CBAz˜B (20)367
where (a) is obtained by defining368
CBA 
[
C1FB 0NBK×NBN
0NB(N−K)×NBN C2FB
]
,369
z˜B 
[ 1√
ρ z˜B,1
z˜B,2
]
∼ CN2 NBN (0,J)370
with J =
[
(1/ρ)σ20INBN 0NBN
0NBN σ
2
0INBN
]
,371
and using the fact that
[
C1
C2
]
≡ INBN . The covariance matrix 372
of CBAz˜B can be calculated as follows: 373
CBAJC
†
BA =
[
(1/ρ)σ20C1FBF
†
BC
†
1 0
0 σ20C2FBF
†
BC
†
2
]
374
=
[
(1/ρ)σ20INBK 0
0 σ20INB(N−K)
]
(21) 375
where the last equality follows that FBF†B = INBN , 376
C1C
†
1 = INBK and C2C
†
2 = INB(N−K). 377
Let yBn be the nth subcarrier received signal. We have 378
yBn = resize(n− 1)NB + 1nNB {yB} 379
=
[
0NB×(n−1)NB INB 0NB×(N−n)NB
]︸ ︷︷ ︸
CBn
yB 380
= CBnyB. (22) 381
D. AN Design at Alice to Cancel Interference at Bob 382
As seen in (20), the presence of AN terms d and d˜ causes 383
interference at Bob. To cancel the interference, Alice can 384
design B and Q subject to 385{
HBAB = 0
RcpB H˜
cp
BAQ = 0.
(23) 386
Using (2) and (15), we can find out the solution B to the 387
equation HBAB = 0 as follows: 388
HBAB = 0 ⇔ blkdiag {HBA1B1, . . . ,HBANBN} = 0 389
⇔ Bn = H⊥BAn , ∀n ∈ {1, . . . , N}. (24) 390
Now it is obvious that B = blkdiag {B1, . . . ,BN} = 391
blkdiag
{
H⊥BA1 , . . . ,H
⊥
BAN
}
is a matrix with NAN rows and 392
(NA − NB)N columns due to Bn ∈ CNA×(NA−NB). The 393
existence of B, in general, depends on the existence of all 394
elements {Bn}Nn=1. Each Bn exists if and only if its second 395
dimension is positive, i.e., 396
NA −NB > 0 ⇔ NB < NA. (25) 397
Likewise, we deduce Q ∈ CNA(N+Ncp)×(NA(N+Ncp)−r) with 398
r = rank
(
RcpB H˜
cp
BA
)
= min{NBN,NA(N + Ncp)}. For the 399
existence of Q, it is required to have the condition NA(N + 400
Ncp)− r > 0, which leads to 401
r = NBN ⇔ NBN < NA(N + Ncp). (26) 402
Note that once (25) has been satisfied, (26) will be satisfied as 403
well. Thus, the case of NA > NB is taken into account in this 404
paper. Then, we will be able to design Bn ∈ CNA×(NA−NB), 405
dn ∈ C(NA−NB)×1, Q ∈ CNA(N+Ncp)×(NA(N+Ncp)−NBN) and 406
d˜ ∈ C(NA(N+Ncp)−NBN)×1. 407
Substituting (23) into (20) and (22), we can rewrite 408
yB =
√
βBAHBAXa + CBAz˜B 409
=
√
βBAHBA diag (a) [ x1, . . . , x1︸ ︷︷ ︸
NA elements
, . . . , xN , . . . , xN︸ ︷︷ ︸
NA elements
] 410
+CBAz˜B (27) 411
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TABLE I
A TABLE OF FREQUENTLY-USED SYMBOLS
and412
yBn =
√
βBACBnHBAXa + CBnCBAz˜B413
(a)
=
√
βBAHBAnanxn + CBnCBAz˜B (28)414
where (a) is obtained by using block matrix multiplication to415
calculate the product CBnHBAXa. The covariance matrix of416
CBnCBAz˜B can be calculated as:417
CBn
(
CBAJC
†
BA
)
C†Bn = (1/n)σ
2
0INB418
where n =
{
ρ if 1 ≤ n ≤ K
1 if K + 1 ≤ n ≤ N . (29)419
For readability, we present a table of symbols, Table I, at the420
top of the next page.421
III. ACHIEVABLE SECRECY RATE422
In this section, we formulate the achievable secrecy rate,423
which is the lower-bound of the capacity difference between424
the Bob-Alice link and the Eve-Alice link.425
A. Mutual Information Between Bob and Alice426
Let IBAn (yBn ;xn) (or simply IBAn) be the mutual infor-427
mation of the nth MIMO-OFDM subcarrier between Bob and428
Alice. From (28), IBAn (yBn ;xn) (in nats/OFDM block) can429
be expressed as [26]:430
IBAn (yBn ;xn) ≡ IBAn431
= ln det
(
INB +
(√
βBAHBAn
)
anE
{|xn|2}a†n432
×
(√
βBAHBAn
)†(σ20
n
INB
)−1)
= ln
(
1 +
∥∥√βBAHBAnwn∥∥2
(1/n)
)
(30)433
where wn 
√
E{|xn|2}
σ20
an =
√
pn
σ20
an.434
Let IBA (yB; {xn}n=1,...,N ) (or simply IBA) be the total 435
mutual information of the MIMO-OFDM subcarriers between 436
Bob and Alice. From (27), we have [27] 437
IBA = ln det
(
INBN +
√
βBAHBA diag (a) 438
× diag ( p1, . . . , p1︸ ︷︷ ︸
NA elements
, . . . , pN , . . . , pN︸ ︷︷ ︸
NA elements
) 439
×
(√
βBAHBA diag (a)
)† (
CBAJC
†
BA
)−1 )
440
(a)
= ln det
(
INBN + blkdiag
(
1βBAHBA1W1HBA1
†, 441
. . . , NβBAHBANWNHBAN
†
))
442
=
N∑
n=1
IBAn (31) 443
where (a) is obtained by using (21) and the sub- 444
stitutions of HBA = blkdiag
{
HBA1 , . . . ,HBAN
}
and 445
Wn = (pn/σ20)ana†n. 446
B. Mutual Information Between Eve and Alice 447
From (13), the mutual information (in nats/OFDM block) 448
of the nth MIMO-OFDM subcarrier between Eve and Alice 449
can be expressed as follows: 450
IEAn (yEn ;xn) = IEAn 451
= ln det
(
INE +
(√
βEAHEAn
)
anE
{|xn|2} a†n 452
×
(√
βEAHEAn
)† (
σ20Ξn
)−1 )
453
= ln
(
1 + βEAw†nH
†
EAnΞ
−1
n HEAnwn
)
(32) 454
where 455
Ξn  (σ2/σ20)βEAHEAnBnB†nH†EAn 456
+CEn
[
(σ˜2/σ20)βEAEE
† + INEN
]
C†En , 457
E  FERcpE H˜
cp
EAQ. 458
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Note that Ξn is a positive definite matrix we can make singular459
value decomposition Ξn = VnDnV†n with a nonegative460
diagonal matrix Dn and unitary matrix Vn. Then461
Ξ−1n = VnD
−1/2
n
(
VnD−1/2n
)†
462
and IEAn in (32) is expressed as463
IEAn = ln
(
1 + βEAw†nH
†
EAnVnD
−1/2
n464
×
(
D−1/2n V
†
nHEAnwn
))
465
= ln
(
1 +
∥∥∥√βEAD−1/2n V†nHEAnwn∥∥∥2) . (33)466
Meanwhile, the total mutual information IEA (in467
nats/OFDM block) of all MIMO-OFDM subcarriers between468
Eve and Alice can be deduced from (12) as follows:469
IEA = ln det
(
INEN +
√
βEAHEA diag(a)470
× diag ( p1, . . . , p1︸ ︷︷ ︸
NA elements
, . . . , pN , . . . , pN︸ ︷︷ ︸
NA elements
)471
×
(√
βEAHEA diag(a)
)† (
σ20Ξ
)−1 )
472
(a)
= ln det
(
INEN + blkdiag
{
βEAHEA1W1H
†
EA1Ξ
−1
1 ,473
. . . , βEAHEANWNH
†
EAN Ξ
−1
N
} )
474
=
N∑
n=1
IEAn (34)475
where476
Ξ =
σ2
σ20
βEAHEABB†H
†
EA +
σ˜2
σ20
βEAEE† + INEN477
= (σ2/σ20)βEAblkdiag
{
HEA1B1B
†
1H
†
EA1 ,478
. . . ,HEANBNB
†
NH
†
EAN
}
479
+(σ˜2/σ20)βEAEE
† + INEN480
= blkdiag {Ξ1, . . . ,ΞN} .481
The equality (a) is obtained by using the fact that482
Ξ−1 = blkdiag
{
Ξ−11 , . . . ,Ξ
−1
N
}
.483
IV. HARVESTED ENERGY484
In this section, we present the total energy that Bob harvests485
during the first and second portions.486
Firstly, the harvested energy during the first portion can be487
calculated from (16) as follows:488
Ecp = ητ cpβBA trace
{
CcpH˜cpBAE
{
s˜s˜†
}(
CcpH˜cpBA
)†}
489
= ητ cpσ20
[ ∥∥∥√βBAΥcpTcpA F†Aw∥∥∥2490
+trace
{
Υcp (βBAΛ) (Υcp)
†
} ]
(35)491
where Υcp = CcpH˜cpBA. Secondly, from (18) we can also492
calculate the harvested energy during the second portion as493
follows: 494
EPS = η(Kτs)(1 − ρ)βBAE
{∥∥∥resize1NBK{RcpBH˜cpBA˜s}∥∥∥2} 495
= ηKτs(1− ρ)βBA 496
× trace
{
C1R
cp
B H˜
cp
BAE
{
s˜s˜†
}(
C1R
cp
B H˜
cp
BA
)†}
497
= η (Kτs) (1− ρ) 498
× σ20
[ ∥∥∥√βBAΥPSTcpA F†Aw∥∥∥2 499
+trace
{
ΥPS (βBAΛ)
(
ΥPS
)†}] (36) 500
where ΥPS = C1RcpB H˜
cp
BA. Then, the total harvested energy 501
can be given by 502
Etotal (ρ,w) = Ecp + EPS 503
= σ20
[
− ρE1 + E2 +
∥∥∥√βBAΓ1w∥∥∥2 504
+(1− ρ)
∥∥∥√βBAΓ2w∥∥∥2 ] 505
= σ20
[
−ρE1 + E2 +
∥∥∥√βBAMw∥∥∥2 506
−ρ
∥∥∥√βBAΓ2w∥∥∥2] (37) 507
where 508
2E1 = ηKτstrace
{
ΥPS (βBAΛ)
(
ΥPS
)†}
, (38a) 509
E2 = E1 + ητ cptrace
{
Υcp (βBAΛ) (Υcp)
†}
, (38b) 510
Γ1 =
√
ητ cp ΥcpTcpA F
†
A, (38c) 511
Γ2 =
√
ηKτs ΥPST
cp
A F
†
A, (38d) 512
M = M† =
(
Γ†1Γ1 + Γ
†
2Γ2
)1/2
. (38e) 513
V. TRADE-OFF PROBLEM FORMULATION 514
This section tackles the trade-off problems between the 515
secure performance and the total harvested energy. Such trade- 516
off problems will be presented in terms of optimization prob- 517
lems. For the purpose of comparing the performance of the 518
system, we propose the following two maximization problems: 519
• Maximizing the difference 520
Δ(ρ,w) = IBA − IEA =
∑N
n=1 IBAn −
∑N
n=1 IEAn 521
(39) 522
subject to Etotal-based and power-based constraints. 523
Herein, it must be noted that the achievable secrecy rate 524
Rsec will be calculated as 525
Rsec = max{0,Δ(ρ,w)}. (40) 526
Due to this relation, we only need to focus on Δ(ρ,w) 527
rather than Rsec. In short, our first problem is to 528
maximize
ρ,w
Δ(ρ,w) (41a) 529
subject to Etotal (ρ,w) ≥ E0, (41b) 530
and (9). (41c) 531
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• Maximizing the total harvested energy Etotal (ρ,w) sub-532
ject to Δ-based and power-based constraints. In particu-533
lar, our second problem is to534
2 maximize
ρ,w
Etotal (ρ,w) (42a)535
subject to Δ(ρ,w) ≥ Δ0, (42b)536
and (9). (42c)537
Note that E0 in (41b) and Δ0 in (42b) are the desired energy538
and the desired secrecy rate, respectively. These two quantities539
reflect the quality-of-service of our secure scheme, and their540
values are pre-determined.541
A. Inner Convex Approximations for Non-Convex Problems542
The optimization problems (41) and (42) are non-convex543
because both the objective function Δ(ρ,w) in (39) and544
the objective function Etotal (ρ,w) in (37) are not concave,545
while both constraint (41b) and constraint (42b) are not546
convex. To address (41) and (42) we will employ inner convex547
approximation at each iteration. Let (ρ(κ),w(κ)) be a feasible548
point for (41) or (42), which is found at the (κ−1)th iteration.549
At the κth iteration, we will550
• Approximate Δ(ρ,w) in (39) by a lower bounding con-551
cave function Δ(κ)lower (ρ,w), which matches with Δ(ρ,w)552
at
(
ρ(κ),w(κ)
)
, i.e.553
Δ(ρ,w) ≥ Δ(κ)lower(ρ,w) ∀ (ρ,w) (43)554
and555
Δ(ρ(κ),w(κ)) = Δ(κ)lower(ρ
(κ),w(κ)). (44)556
• Approximate Etotal(ρ,w) in (37) by a lower bound-557
ing concave function E(κ)lower (ρ,w), which matches with558
Etotal (ρ,w) at
(
ρ(κ),w(κ)
)
, i.e.559
Etotal(ρ,w) ≥ E(κ)lower(ρ,w) ∀ (ρ,w), (45)560
and561
Etotal(ρ(κ),w(κ)) = E(κ)lower(ρ(κ),w(κ)). (46)562
• Innerly approximate the nonconvex constraints (41b) and563
(42b) by the convex constraint564
E(κ)lower (ρ,w) ≥ E0, (47)565
and566
Δ(κ)lower (ρ,w) ≥ Δ0, (48)567
respectively. Indeed, it follows from (43) and (45) that568
any feasible point for the convex constraint (47) ((48),569
resp.) is also feasible for the nonconvex constraint (41b)570
((42b), resp.).571
Proposition 1: Let x ∈ C, x¯ ∈ C, y > 0 and y¯ > 0. The572
inequality573
ln
(
1 +
|x|2
y
)
≥ ln
(
1 +
|x¯|2
y¯
)
− |x¯|
2
y¯
574
+2
{x¯∗x}
y¯
− |x¯|
2
y¯ (y¯ + |x¯|2)
(
y + |x|2)575
(49)576
holds true [9]. The RHS of (49) is a concave function [28]. 577
Proposition 2: For x > 0 and x¯ > 0, the inequality 578
ln(1 + x) ≤ ln(1 + x¯)− x¯
1 + x¯
+
x
1 + x¯
(50) 579
always holds true. The RHS of (50) is a convex function of x. 580
Note that (50) holds true because its RHS is the first-order 581
Taylor approximation of its left hand side (LHS), which is a 582
concave function [28]. 583
1) Obtaining Δ(κ)lower (ρ,w) : Applying Proposition 1 to 584
IBAn in (30) yields 585
IBAn ≥ ln
⎛⎜⎝1 +
∥∥∥√βBAHBAnw(κ)n ∥∥∥2
1
/

(κ)
n
⎞⎟⎠ 586
−
∥∥∥√βBAHBAnw(κ)n ∥∥∥2
1
/

(κ)
n
587
−
∥∥∥√βBAHBAnw(κ)n ∥∥∥2 ( 1n + ∥∥√βBAHBAnwn∥∥2)
1
/

(κ)
n
(
1
/

(κ)
n +
∥∥∥√βBAHBAnw(κ)n ∥∥∥2) 588
 f (κ) (wn, n) 589
=
{
f (κ) (wn, ρ) if 1 ≤ n ≤ K
f (κ) (wn, 1) if K + 1 ≤ n ≤ N
(51) 590
At the same time, applying Proposition 2 yields 591
IEAn ≤ ln
(
1 +
∥∥∥√βEAD−1/2n V†nHEAnw(κ)n ∥∥∥2) 592
−
∥∥∥√βEAD−1/2n V†nHEAnw(κ)n ∥∥∥2
1 +
∥∥∥√βEAD−1/2n V†nHEAnw(κ)n ∥∥∥2 593
+
∥∥∥√βEAD−1/2n V†nHEAnwn∥∥∥2
1 +
∥∥∥√βEAD−1/2n V†nHEAnw(κ)n ∥∥∥2 594
 g(κ+1) (wn) . (52) 595
Using (39), (51) and (52), the concave function 596
Δ(κ)lower (ρ,w) =
K∑
n=1
f (κ) (wn, ρ) +
N∑
n=K+1
f (κ) (wn, 1) 597
−
N∑
n=1
g(κ) (wn) (53) 598
satisfies (43) and (44) and thus is qualified as a lower bounding 599
approximation of Δlower(ρ,w). 600
2) Obtaining E(κ)lower (ρ,w) : Let M = [m1,m2, . . . ,mNAN ] 601
with mi being the ith column of M. One can derive the 602
following inequality: 603
‖Mw‖2 = ‖M†w‖2 =
NAN∑
i=1
∣∣∣m†iw∣∣∣2 604
≥ 2
NAN∑
i=1

{
(m†iw
(κ))∗(m†iw)
}
−
∥∥∥M†w(κ)∥∥∥2 605
 (1/βBA) ð(κ+1) (w) (54) 606
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over the trust region607
2
{
(m†iw
(κ))∗(m†iw)
}
−|m†iw(κ)|2>0, i = 1, . . . , NAN.608
(55)609
Substituting (54) into (37), we can obtain610
Etotal (ρ,w)611
≥ σ20
[
−ρE1 + E2 + ð(κ+1) (w)− ρ
∥∥∥√βBAΓ2w∥∥∥2]612
= σ20
[
E2 + ð(κ+1) (w)−
∥∥∥∥[ √E1√βBA Γ2w
]∥∥∥∥2
/
ρinv
]
613
 E(κ)lower (1/ρinv,w) (56)614
where615
ρinv 
1
ρ
≥ 1, (57)616
verifying (45) and (46), making E(κ)lower (1/ρinv,w) qualified as617
a lower bounding approximation of Etotal (ρ,w).618
3) Algorithms and Convergence: At the κ-th the iteration619
we solve the following convex optimization problems to620
generate the next feasible point
(
ρ
(κ+1)
inv ,w
(κ+1)
)
for (41) and621
(42), respectively:622
2 maximize
ρinv,w
Δ(κ)lower (1/ρinv,w) (58a)623
subject to E(κ)lower (1/ρinv,w) ≥ E0, (58b)624
(9), (55), (57) (58c)625
and626
2maximize
ρinv,w
E(κ)lower (1/ρinv,w) (59a)627
subject to Δ(κ+1)lower (1/ρinv,w) ≥ Δ0, (59b)628
(9), (55), (57). (59c)629
Note that the convex constraints (58b) and (59b) correspond630
to the convex constraints (47) and (48), respectively. Further-631
more, we have632
Δ(κ)lower(1/ρ
(κ+1)
inv ,w
(κ+1)) > Δ(κ)lower(1/ρ
(κ)
inv ,w
(κ)) (60)633
where (1/ρ(κ+1)inv ,w(κ+1)) is the optimal solution of (58) and634
(1/ρ(κ)inv ,w
(κ)) is a feasible point for (58), which together635
with (43) and (44) yield636
Δlower(1/ρ
(κ+1)
inv ,w
(κ+1)) ≥ Δ(κ)lower(1/ρ(κ+1)inv ,w(κ+1))637
> Δ(κ)lower(1/ρ
(κ)
inv ,w
(κ)), (61)638
i.e. (1/ρ(κ+1)inv ,w(κ+1)) is a better feasible point than639
(1/ρ(κ)inv ,w
(κ)) for (41). Therefore, Algorithm 1, which gen-640
erates the sequence {(1/ρ(κ)inv ,w(κ))}, at least converges to a641
locally optimal solution of (41) [9, Proposition 2]).642
Analogously, Algorithm 2 at least converges to a locally643
optimal solution of (42). Once initialized from an initial644
feasible point, both algorithms converge after a few iterations645
for a given error tolerance.646
Convergence: The problem (58) includes two variables ρ647
and w. Given that w is a vector of NAN complex elements,648
Algorithm 1 Path-Following Algorithm for (41)
1: Initialization: Set κ = 0 with an initial feasible point{
ρ
(0)
inv ,w
(0)
}
for (41) (see Appendix A).
2: repeat
3: At the (κ+1)th iteration, solve the inner convex approx-
imation problem (58) to obtain the optimal values ρ(κ+1)inv
and w(κ+1) of variables ρinv and w, respectively.
4: Reset κ := κ + 1.
5: until
∣∣∣∣Δ(κ+1)lower ( 1ρ(κ+1)inv ,w(κ+1)
)
−Δ(κ)lower
(
1
ρ
(κ)
inv
,w(κ)
)∣∣∣∣
converges.
6: return (ρ∗,w∗) =
(
1
/
ρ
(κ+1)
inv ,w
(κ+1)
)
as the desired
feasible point for (41).
Algorithm 2 Path-Following Algorithm for (42)
1: Initialization: Set κ = 0 with an initial feasible point{
ρ
(0)th
inv ,w
(0)th
}
for (42) (see Appendix B).
2: repeat
3: At the (κ+1)th iteration, solve the inner convex approx-
imation problem (59) to obtain the optimal values ρ(κ+1)inv
and w(κ+1) of variables ρinv and w, respectively.
4: Reset κ := κ + 1.
5: until
∣∣∣∣E(κ+1)lower ( 1ρ(κ+1)inv ,w(κ+1)
)
− E(κ)lower
(
1
ρ
(κ)
inv
,w(κ)
)∣∣∣∣
converges.
6: return (ρ∗,w∗) =
(
1
/
ρ
(κ+1)
inv ,w
(κ+1)
)
as the desired
feasible point for (42).
the total number of scalar variables is equal to 2 NAN + 1. 649
Herein, the real part and the imaginary part of each complex 650
element in w are considered as independent variables. The 651
number of quadratic constraints is equal to 
1 = 2. Thus, 652
the per-iteration computational complexity of Algorithm 1 is 653
O ((2 NAN + 1)2
2.51 + 
3.51 ) [29, Ch. 10]. Likewise, Algo- 654
rithm 2 is also invoked to resolve (59). With 2NAN+1 distinct 655
variables and 
2 = 2 quadratic constraints, the per-iteration 656
cost is O ((2 NAN + 1)2
2.52 + 
3.52 ). 657
VI. NUMERICAL RESULTS 658
In this section, we provide numerical results to evaluate 659
the performance of proposed maximization problems. More 660
particularly, we draw the average curves of the achievable 661
secrecy rate Rsec (ρ,w) = max{0,Δ(ρ,w)} and the total 662
harvested energy Etotal (ρ,w) over numerous realizations of 663
βBA, βEA, {GBAl}Nl=1 and {GEAl}Nl=1. 664
While the realization of
{
βBA, {GBAl}Nl=1
}
implies the 665
instantaneous observation of the channel between Alice and 666
Bob, the realization of
{
βEA, {GEAl}Nl=1
}
corresponds to 667
instantaneous observation of the Alice-Eve channel at the 668
time of measurement. Note that Algorithm 1 and Algo- 669
rithm 2 are conducted in the case that βBA, βEA, {GBAl}Nl=1 670
and {GEAl}Nl=1 are given. Let {ρ,w} be one of the feasible 671
solutions after running Algorithm 1 (or Algorithm 2). Then, 672
our goals are to evaluate 673
Ravrsec = E{GBAl}Nl=1,{GEAl}Nl=1 {Rsec (ρ
∗,w∗)} , 674
Eavrtotal = E{GBAl}Nl=1,{GEAl}Nl=1 {Etotal (ρ
∗,w∗)} . 675
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Fig. 2. The convergence rate of the proposed algorithms. Other parameters:
N = 10, K = 2, and {PA, σ2,  σ2} = {30, 10, 10} dBm.
In short, the use of Algorithm 1 (or Algorithm 2, respectively)676
to solve (58) (or (59), respectively) yields a certain point677
{ρ,w}. Then, the substitution ρ = ρ,w = w into the678
expressions of Rsec and E will yield the instantaneous values679
at the time of measurement. Generating sufficiently large num-680
ber of realizations of βBA, βEA, {GBAl}Nl=1 and {GEAl}Nl=1,681
we can calculate the average values for the secrecy rate and682
harvested energy.683
In simulation, the time-domain fading channel matrices684
GBAl and GEAl can be assumed to be symmetric complex685
Gaussian random variables. More particularly, we assume686
GBAl ∼ CN (0, 1) and GEAl ∼ CN (0, 1) for ∀l ∈ {1, . . . , L}.687
The values of βBA and βEA rely on the rule of power688
degradation and the shadowing fading effect. For instance,689
if the distance between two transceivers is below 50 meters,690
the path loss can be around −90 dB. That may lead to691
βBA = 10(−90+SBA)/10, and βEA = 10(−90+SEA)/10 where SBA692
and SEA represent the shadowing. For simplicity, let us set693
SBA = SEA = 10. Other simulation parameters are as follows:694
Ncp = 3, NA = 6, NB = 3, NE = 4, L = 3, σ20 = −80 dBm,695
τs = 0.1 s, η = 80%, Δ0 = 0, and E0 = 20 σ20 .696
Fig. 2 illustrates the convergence rate for each of the697
proposed algorithms. It is not surprising that Algorithm 1 and698
Algorithm 2 converge within only 2 iterations because of699
the fact that (58) and (59) contain only quadratic and linear700
constraints.701
Fig. 3 shows the relation between Ravrsec and N . The largest702
value of Ravrsec is obtained at N = 11 in the case of Algorithm 1.703
Meanwhile, Ravrsec takes the largest value at N = 9 subcarriers704
in the case of Algorithm 2. The curve of Algorithm 1 shows an705
uptrend with N ∈ {5, . . . , 11} but start a strong downtrend at706
N = 12. While the curve of Algorithm 2 is in an uptrend707
with N ∈ {5, . . . , 9}, then slightly reducing at N = 10,708
increasing at N = 11 before reducing again at N = 12.709
Lastly, on average, Algorithm 1 provides higher secrecy rate710
than Algorithm 2.711
In Fig. 4, the relation between Eavrtotal and N is illustrated.712
We can see that Algorithm 1 is better than Algorithm 2 in713
terms of energy-harvesting. In fact, Eavrtotal in Algorithm 1 is714
Fig. 3. The achievable secrecy rate Rsec as a function of the
number of subcarriers N . Other system parameters: K = 2 and
{PA, σ2,  σ2} = {30, 10, 10} dBm.
higher than Eavrtotal in Algorithm 2 by the amount of above 715
30σ20 at each value of N ; however, the values of Eavrtotal in both 716
algorithms are nearly the same at N = 12. For Algorithm 1, 717
Eavrtotal increases with N ∈ {5, 6, 7} and decreases with 718
N ∈ {8, . . . , 12}. As for Algorithm 2, Eavrtotal reaches a peak 719
of Eavrtotal = 384σ20 when N = 9. 720
In order to achieve the balance between Ravrsec and Eavrtotal, 721
we observe Figs. 3–4 and suggest using either N = 8 for 722
Algorithm 1 or N = 9 for Algorithm 2. Note that the system 723
parameters used in these two figures are the same. Also 724
in Figs. 3–4, the gap between the two algorithms tends to 725
become closer when N increases. The curves are not increas- 726
ing/decreasing monotonic, but they fluctuate with respect 727
with N . 728
In Fig. 5, the relation between Ravrsec and K is shown. Ravrsec 729
in Algorithm 1 reaches the highest peak at K = 2 and 730
then steadily goes down; while Ravrsec in Algorithm 2 always 731
decreases with all values of K . When compared with each 732
other, the first proposed algorithm shows its superiority over 733
the other at K = {1, . . . , 4}, and both of algorithms reduce to 734
zero at K = {7, 8}. The curves in Fig. 5 suggest choosing a 735
small value of K to gain a satisfactory amount of the average 736
secrecy rate. 737
In Fig. 6, the relation between Eavrtotal and K is depicted. Once 738
again, Algorithm 1 is superior to Algorithm 2 at all integer 739
values of K , although the formulation of Algorithm 2 is 740
inherently intended for maximizing the harvested energy. 741
In reality, Algorithm 2 sometimes results in the instantaneously 742
harvested energy better than Algorithm 1 at some realization of 743
channels; however, on average, Eavrtotal in Algorithm 2 is much 744
lower than Eavrtotal in Algorithm 1. Noticeably, even when we 745
make use of the PS SWIPT scheme for all NBN informative 746
samples by setting K = N = 8, the amount of harvested 747
energy is not really among the highest ones, e.g. Eavrtotal at K = 8 748
is worse than at K = {2, 3, 4}. 749
It can be seen from Figs. 5–6 that Algorithm 1 brings 750
about much better system performance than Algorithm 2 in 751
terms of both security and energy. Thus, we suggest using 752
Algorithm 1 with the used parameters. Once Algorithm 1 has 753
been used, the best value of K is K = 2 because this value 754
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Fig. 4. The ratio of total harvested energy Eavrtotal to σ20 as a function
of the number of subcarriers N . Other system parameters: K = 2 and
{PA, σ2,  σ2} = {30, 10, 10} dBm.
Fig. 5. The achievable secrecy rate Rsec as a function of the parameter K .
Other system parameters: N = 8 and {PA, σ2,  σ2} = {30, 10, 10} dBm.
Fig. 6. The ratio of total harvested energy Eavrtotal to σ20 as a function
of the parameter K . Other system parameters: N = 8 and
{PA, σ2,  σ2} = {30, 10, 10} dBm.
can lead to a good balance between highly achievable Ravrsec and755
Eavrtotal, i.e.,
{
Ravrsec,
Eavrtotal
σ20
}
≈ {14.7 nats/OFDM block, 407.8} at756
K = 2.757
Fig. 7 shows that Algorithm 1 is superior to Algorithm 2 in758
terms of security in both considered sub-cases of. Regarding759
Algorithm 1, the changes in values are quite significant with760
PA ∈ (21, 28) dBm. Meanwhile, Algorithm 2 shows the761
slight difference between two sub-cases. When considering762
the first sub-case, one can see that the secure performance of763
Algorithm 1 is only slightly lower than Algorithm 2 at moder-764
ate PA ∈ (23, 25) dBm, but it is much higher than Algorithm 2765
Fig. 7. The ratio of total harvested energy Eavrtotal to σ20 as a function
of the parameter PA. Two sub-cases are considered. In the first sub-case,
we set {σ2,  σ2} = {−2, 0} dBm. The second sub-case, we set {σ2,  σ2} =
{−2, 3} dBm. Other system parameters: N = 7 and K = 3.
Fig. 8. The ratio of total harvested energy Eavrtotal to σ20 as a function
of the parameter PA. Two sub-cases are considered. In the first sub-
case, we set {σ2,  σ2} = {−2, 0} dBm. The second sub-case, we set
{σ2,  σ2} = {−2, 3} dBm. Other system parameters: N = 7 and K = 3.
Fig. 9. The ratio of total harvested energy Eavrtotal to σ20 as a function
of the parameter PA. Two sub-cases are considered. In the first sub-
case, we set {σ2,  σ2} = {−2, 0} dBm. The second sub-case, we set
{σ2,  σ2} = {2, 0} dBm. Other system parameters: N = 7 and K = 3.
at high PA. For the second sub-case, Algorithm 1 is almost 766
better than Algorithm 2 at all values of PA. 767
Fig. 8 shows that Eavrtotal increases with PA. Besides, 768
the achieved values of Eavrtotal in case 1 (with σ˜2 = 0 dBm) are 769
lower than those in case 2 (with σ˜2 = 3 dBm). Interestingly, 770
we can see that the larger σ˜2 (i.e., the more power we spend 771
on generating the temporal AN d˜), the more energy Bob can 772
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Fig. 10. The ratio of total harvested energy Eavrtotal to σ20 as a function
of the parameter PA. Two sub-cases are considered. In the first sub-
case, we set {σ2,  σ2} = {−2, 0} dBm. The second sub-case, we set
{σ2,  σ2} = {2, 0} dBm. Other system parameters: N = 7 and K = 3.
harvest. From Figs. 7–8, one can see that the difference in773
performance between Algorithm 1 and Algorithm 2 expands774
when PA increases.775
Both Fig. 9 and Fig. 10 confirm the superiority of776
Algorithm 1 over Algorithm 2 in terms of security and har-777
vested energy, especially at high PA. Moreover, Fig. 9 shows778
that the secure performance is not proportional to σ2. This779
means that assigning more power to the frequency-domain780
AN may not help improve security level. While the energy781
efficiency seems to be proportional to the increase in σ2 as782
shown in Fig. 10. When comparing Figs. 8 and 10, it is783
observed that in terms of energy, the power allocation for σ2784
(see Fig. 10) brings about worse performance than the power785
allocation for σ˜2 (see Fig. 8) does. This observation implies786
that instead of increasing σ2 by the amount of 4 dBm, it is787
preferable to increase σ˜2 by the amount of 3 dBm.788
VII. CONCLUSION789
In this paper, we have analyzed a MIMO-OFDM SWIPT790
network and proposed two types of maximization problems791
to improve secrecy rate and harvested energy, respectively.792
Two path-following iterative algorithms of low computational793
complexity have been also provided to solve two different non-794
convex problems, whereby the sub-optimal solutions (ρ∗,w∗)795
have been given. The impact of other key parameters, related796
to the aspects of security and energy-harvesting, have been also797
evaluated through numerical results. Overall, we observed that798
the system performance is not proportional to N , K , σ2 and799
σ˜2; thus the choice of these parameters will pose challenges800
to designers. In contrast, the system performance is enhanced801
with the increase in the power budget PA. Moreover, it will802
be the responsibility of designers to choose the most suitable803
algorithm, because each algorithm results in a different per-804
formance. With the used parameters in this paper, we suggest805
using Algorithm 1 because it is superior to Algorithm 2 in806
resolving the trade-off problem between security and energy-807
harvesting. In the future, it is worth considering the impact of808
non-linear EH models on the secure performance of MIMO-809
OFDM SWIPT networks since such models reflect better the810
practical utility of EH circuits/receivers. Borrowing the idea of811
using machine learning and EH history to predict renewable 812
energy generation trends [30], we can also consider making 813
predictions about the amount of information leakage for future 814
work. 815
APPENDIX 816
A. Locating an Initial Feasible Point for (41) 817
A feasible point for (41) must satisfy (41b) and (41c). 818
Due to the non-convexity of (41b), we invoke once again 819
the inner convex approximation by replacing Etotal (ρ,w) with 820
E(ϑ+1)lower (1/ρinv,w) at the (ϑ + 1)th iteration. In parallel, 821
the accompanying constraint (55) (in which κ must be replaced 822
with ϑ) are needed. In short, a feasible point for (41) can be 823
found by solving the following inner convex approximation 824
problem: 825
2 maximize
ρinv,w
1 (62a) 826
subject to E(ϑ+1)lower (1/ρinv,w) ≥ E0, (62b) 827
(9), (55), (57) (62c) 828
at the (ϑ + 1)th iteration. The above-proposed problem is to 829
find an initial feasible point for Algorithm 1, but this problem 830
itself requires an initial point to run. To find its own initial 831
point, we simply find (ρinv,w) satisfying (9), (55) and (57). 832
B. Locating an Initial Feasible Point for (42) 833
Similar to Appendix A, at the (ϑ + 1)th iteration, we need 834
to solve the following inner convex approximation problem to 835
find an initial feasible of (42): 836
2 maximize
ρinv,w
1 (63a) 837
subject to Δ(ϑ+1)lower (1/ρinv,w) ≥ Δ0, (63b) 838
(9), (57). (63c) 839
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